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ADR's PLACE IN FORECLOSURE:
REMEDYING THE FLAWS OF A SECURITIZED
HOUSING MARKET
Lydia Nussbaumt
Millions of Americans lost their homes during the foreclosure crisis, an
unprecedented disaster still plaguing local and national economies. A primary
factor contributing to the crisis has been the failure of conventional
foreclosure procedures to account for the new realities of securitization and
the secondary mortgage market, which transformed the traditional borrower-
lender relationship. To compensate for the shortcomings of conventional
foreclosure procedures and stem the tide of residential foreclosure, state and
local governments turned to ADR processes for a solution. Some foreclosure
ADR programs, however, have greater potential to avoid foreclosures than
others. This Article comprehensively examines the key components of
foreclosure ADR programs and presents best practices for governments seeking
to utilize ADR as a tool to mitigate the foreclosure crisis and re-energize the
economy.
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INTRODUCTION
As the foreclosure crisis unfolded, causing millions of people to
lose their homes and trillions of dollars in real estate investments to
evaporate, much came to light about the metamorphosis of the
mortgage industry between the early 1990s and 2008. Without much
public attention, brand new markets and industries were born. The
proliferation of new products like mortgage-backed securities that
investment banks could now legally buy, sell, and repackage spawned a
secondary mortgage market that never before existed. Homeowners'
mortgages were not sitting on the books of their local savings and loan;
instead, they were bundled, sliced, and sold in slivers to unknown
investors around the world.
The foreclosure crisis also exposed the inadequacy of conventional
foreclosure proceedings, given how dramatically the mortgage industry
had changed. Typical judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings
assume a direct relationship between borrower and lender that, post
securitization, no longer exists for the vast majority of mortgages. This
1890 [Vol. 34:1889
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changed relationship, when combined with an unprecedented volume of
cases and a collapsed housing market, compromised the integrity of the
entire foreclosure process.
In response, state and local governments' instituted a variety of
public policy interventions designed to slow foreclosure rates, stop
unnecessary foreclosures, and help homeowners remain in their homes.2
These programs were instituted because the loss of homeowners
and subsequent erosion of communities posed, and continues to pose,
the greatest threat to economic stability across the country. 3 However,
in order to keep homeowners in their homes and avert further economic
catastrophe, the problematic relationship between homeowners,
investors, and third-party loan servicers had to be overcome.
To overcome this challenge, many state and local governments
turned to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes. Foreclosure
ADR programs have the potential to address the problems of
securitization by establishing direct communication between a
homeowner and a decision-maker with the authority to undertake an
alternative to foreclosure. These programs modify conventional legal
procedures for residential mortgage foreclosure by incorporating an
ADR process such as mediation, conciliation, or a facilitated settlement
negotiation meeting.4 Including an ADR process as a compulsory step
in foreclosure gives the homeowner a right to negotiate with the loan
1 The federal government also instituted programs, but these applied to the macro level,
primarily addressing government and financial institutions at the heart of the mortgage and
housing industries. While not the focus of this Article, these federal programs are discussed in
greater detail below. See infra note 81.
2 Programs include protecting consumers from foreclosure "rescue" scams, connecting
borrowers to housing counselors, assisting homeowners with refinancing, slowing the
foreclosure process, banning common predatory loan practices, adopting regulatory guidelines
for subprime and nontraditional mortgage products, educating homebuyers, helping first time
home buyers purchase foreclosed properties, improved enforcement of mortgage fraud and
lending laws, and heightened regulation of mortgage brokers and loan originators. For a
complete list of state legislation, see Foreclosures Publications and Resources,
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/
foreclosures-publications- and-resources.aspx (last updated Jan. 4, 2012).
3 FED. RESERVE Sys., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS (2012), available at http://federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/
housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf. A 2009 study by the Urban Institute, citing a report
prepared for the U.S. Senate joint Economic Committee, states that the estimated total cost of a
single foreclosure is $79,443, which includes cost to the homeowner ($7200), costs incurred by
the lender or loan servicer ($50,000), cost to local government ($19,229), and costs to neighbors
adjacent to the foreclosed property ($3016). G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ROBIN SMITH & DAVID
PRICE, URBAN INSTITUTE, THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 21
(2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411909-impact offorclosures.pdf.
4 Both mediation and conciliation bring disputing parties together with a third party who
helps the parties identify issues, overcome communication barriers, and explore possible
options for resolving the dispute. Both processes are unantagonistic and, unlike settlement, do
not require a lawsuit, though conciliation is usually less structured than in mediation. 4 AM.
JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution §§ 4-6 (2012).
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servicer, a third party new to the residential mortgage landscape, and
also provides for some oversight of the loan servicer's decision-making.
Each jurisdiction has served as a laboratory, developing programs
tailored to local needs and experimenting with different ways to use
ADR processes in foreclosure proceedings. ADR programs have proven
remarkably effective in many jurisdictions but some approaches have
more impact than others.
This article comprehensively examines the characteristics of these
state and local government programs and presents suggestions for best
practices. Currently, many states are considering including ADR as a
permanent part of foreclosure proceedings and the Uniform Law
Commission is in the process of drafting model legislation to include
ADR in residential mortgage foreclosure processes. 5 This article is
intended to guide lawmakers and consumer advocates toward those
approaches most likely to mitigate the foreclosure crisis and re-energize
the economy.
The first part of this article explains why the conventional
foreclosure process proved ill equipped to respond to the foreclosure
crisis. It explains how securitization changed the relationship between
homeowners and lenders by introducing a new third-party loan
servicer. This changed relationship, compounded by an unprecedented
volume of foreclosures and a collapsed housing market, overwhelmed
the existing legal procedures for foreclosure, necessitating the need for
an alternative process. The second part of this article examines why
foreclosure ADR programs are a useful tool for state and local
governments seeking to respond to the foreclosure crisis. By bringing
homeowners and loan servicers together for a structured negotiation
about the loan, foreclosure ADR programs can help prevent
uneconomical foreclosures. The third part examines key components of
foreclosure ADR programs and identifies best practices. In examining
how these programs differ, this article is able to present options for
creating, implementing, and structuring a foreclosure ADR program
and identify which options are most likely to alleviate the effects of the
foreclosure crisis. The article concludes with some observations about
foreclosure mediation programs and calls for more thorough and
systematic assessment of their impact in resolving foreclosure cases and
buoying local housing markets.
5 Residential Real Estate Mortgage Foreclosure Process and Protections, UNIF.
LAW COMM'N, http://uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Residential%20Real%20Estate
%20Mortgage%20Foreclosure%20Process%20and%2OProtections (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
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I. INADEQUACY OF CONVENTIONAL FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES
This section begins by examining conventional foreclosure
procedures and their origins in the primary mortgage market. It then
argues that these conventional foreclosure procedures failed to account
for new players created by securitization and the secondary mortgage
market. These new players changed the way in which foreclosure
decisions were made. As a result, when the foreclosure crisis began,
homeowners and investors lacked adequate procedural protections,
deepening the crisis and causing the housing market and national
economy to suffer.
A. Conventional Foreclosure Procedure
Conventional legal foreclosure procedure dates from a time when
there was a direct relationship between borrowers and lenders. To
finance a home, a borrower would go to a local savings and loan and
request a home loan.6 The savings and loan would issue a loan and, in
return, the homeowner would sign a promissory note granting the
savings and loan a mortgage interest in the house as collateral. The
lender kept the loan on its books and took care of managing the loan,
sending out monthly billing statements and collecting payments. A
homeowner's failure to make loan payments as agreed upon would
enable the savings and loan to exercise its right to take title of the
property, a legal remedy provided to lenders.
In a conventional borrower-lender relationship, when a loan
became delinquent the lender had two options. A lender could decide to
foreclose on the loan, take title of the property, and sell it or it could
pursue a loss mitigation "workout."7 A lender had to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis to determine which option was more likely to yield the
greatest value. While selling the property at a foreclosure sale to the
highest bidder could allow the lender to get its money back quickly, a
lender who foreclosed assumed full responsibility for maintaining the
property and also ran the risk that the amount of the loan would not be
recovered at auction. If the lender could work with the borrower to cure
the delinquent loan, thereby keeping the homeowner in the home and
continuing to make monthly payments, then the lender stood to recoup
6 Savings and loan associations, unlike commercial banks, are cooperatives that hold
members' savings deposits and pay interest on them, as well as provide home mortgage loans.
Savings and loans became the primary source of home loans in the United States after the Great
Depression through the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932.
7 DARRYL E. GETTER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34232, THE PROCESS, DATA, AND
COSTS OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 1 (2008).
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more money in the long run because it could collect the principal plus
interest.
Homeowners and lenders in this conventional relationship knew
each other and both had financial stakes in the same community. When
it came to handling a delinquent loan, there was a need for an
individualized assessment-especially in a weak housing market-and
lenders had to consider carefully which of these options made the most
financial sense.
If a lender chose to foreclose, then it had to follow the foreclosure
process codified in state statutes. States employ two types of
conventional foreclosure proceedings. Some jurisdictions use a judicial
foreclosure process that requires a court to review evidence and approve
a lender's foreclosure petition before the lender can proceed with a
forced sale of the mortgaged property. Other states employ nonjudicial
foreclosure, also called power-of-sale or statutory foreclosure, that does
not direct foreclosure proceedings through the courts. Instead, the
foreclosure happens privately between the parties. The lender must
satisfy statutory requirements for notice, documentation, and various
waiting periods before it can take legal title of the property and proceed
with sale at a foreclosure auction.8 Many states permit both types of
foreclosure proceedings but most primarily use one type. 9 Because
judicial foreclosure requires opening a civil suit and attending a judicial
hearing, the process of foreclosing on a property in a judicial foreclosure
state takes longerlo and is more costly for lenders. Additionally, some
states also provide borrowers with a statutory right of redemption, or a
period of time during which the borrower can recover the property if he
provides the lender with the full amount bid at the foreclosure sale plus
additional costs. I I
If, in the alternative, a conventional lender chose to pursue loss
mitigation, then it would have to determine whether, with a few
8 Id. at 2. The auction proceeds after complying with notice requirements, typically
advance notice to the homeowner and detailed advertisements in local news media.
9 ANDREW JAKABOVICS & ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, IT'S TIME WE
TALKED: MANDATORY MEDIATION IN THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS 2 (2009), available
at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/06/pdf/foreclosure-
mediation.pdf.
10 National Public Radio's Planet Money team found that, between 2006 and 2010, the time
for non-judicial foreclosure increased from roughly 130 to 200 days (more than two months)
and the time for judicial foreclosure increased from roughly 145 to 271 days (more than four
months). David Kestenbaum, How Long Does Foreclosure Take?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 26,
2010, 12:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/10/26/130833818/foreclosure.
11 Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose
Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 702 (2008). The National Consumer Law Center surveyed U.S.
foreclosure laws and produced a report finding a basic lack of due process protections. JOHN
RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS
DEPRIVE HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC PROTECTIONS (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/
images/pdf/pr-reports/report-foreclosing-dream.pdf.
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adjustments, a delinquent borrower could cure the loan and continue
making monthly payments. Loss mitigation includes a variety of plans
to reduce borrowers' monthly payments, allowing them to remain in
their homes and continue making payments on the loan. Some
examples of loss mitigation plans include: 1) forbearance, when loan
payments are temporarily delayed; 2) a repayment plan, which allows
homeowners to pay a little extra each month to make up for any missed
payments in the past; 3) permanently restructuring a loan by extending
the time over which the loan must be repaid, changing the interest rate,
reducing the balance of the outstanding principal, or adding the
delinquent interest amount to unpaid principal balance; and, in some
instances, 4) refinancing the home and issuing a new loan altogether.12
A conventional lender could also explore a "non-retention" plan
with a borrower who was still unable to make payments under a loss
mitigation plan. Under a non-retention plan, the borrower forfeits the
property directly to the lender in a way that minimizes the borrower's
financial hardship and saves the lender the trouble of arranging a
foreclosure sale. These non-retention plans include having the lender
agree to a short sale13 or accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure.14 Of course,
the borrower can always sell the home to pay off the mortgage in full.
But, a weak housing market can render the current market value of the
home too low to pay off the mortgage. 15 This situation proves
troublesome for both the borrower and the lender because the asset used
as collateral for the mortgage loan is no longer valuable enough to allow
both parties to walk away from the loan arrangement without significant
loss-neither the borrower nor the lender can sell the home to pay off
the loan.
In determining whether to pursue a foreclosure alternative, a
financially motivated conventional lender will select the option that
minimizes losses.16 This kind of cost-benefit analysis requires close
12 Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities 7 (Fed.
Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2008-46, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2008/200846/200846pap.pdf.
13 In a short sale, the lender or loan servicer agrees to accept the proceeds from a sale of the
home in satisfaction of the loan, even if the proceeds are less than the amount owed. However,
some lenders may still attach a judgment lien against the borrower for the deficiency. SAMUEL
FRUMKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FORECLOSURE PREVENTION: IMPROVING
CONTACT WITH BORROWERS 7 (2007), available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/community-
affairs/publications/insights/insights-foreclosure-prevention.pdf.
14 A deed in lieu of foreclosure is a workout in which the borrower voluntarily conveys
clear property title to the lender in return for a discharge of the debt. This is generally used
when the house has been on the market unsuccessfully for a considerable time. Deeds in lieu of
foreclosure and short sales may be complicated if there are secondary lien holders. Id. at 8.
15 See infra note 58 on meaning of "underwater" and "overleveraged."
16 In 2007, it was estimated that a lender could lose around $50,000 per foreclosure. JOINT
ECON. COMM., SHELTERING NEIGHBORHOODS FROM THE SUBPRIME FORECLOSURE STORM 14
(2007), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/Reports/subprimel lapr2007
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contact with the borrower in order to assess the borrower's financial
circumstances and ability to continue making future payments. It also
requires specialized knowledge of the local housing market, the lender's
liquidity, mortgage financing and research capabilities in order to make
a sound business judgment as to which loss mitigation or non-retention
plan makes the most economic sense for the lender.17
B. Foreclosure in Securitized Framework
A secondary mortgage market superseded the primary mortgage
market that allowed for direct relationships between borrowers and
lenders. Although this new market introduced new players, legal
foreclosure procedures remained the same. 18
The secondary mortgage market developed in the late 1970s, when
the baby-boom generation began to buy houses and economists worried
that the savings and loan industry lacked sufficient capital to fund all of
their mortgages. 19 To address the problem, the federal government
created Freddie Mac to buy up mortgages from savings and loans,
allowing those savings and loans to free up capital and make more
mortgages.20 The federal government then converted the mortgage
interest into a bond, or security, that it could sell to third-party investors
revised.pdf. But that dollar figure accounts only for direct costs of managing a foreclosed
property and excludes the indirect loan servicing costs for investors of a securitized mortgage,
such as attorneys fees to shepherd the case through the foreclosure process.
17 Cordell et al., supra note 12, at 15-16.
18 Direct, borrower-lender loans constitute the primary mortgage market while the
secondary mortgage market consists of mortgage-backed securities and those who trade and
invest in them. Estimates of how many first lien residential mortgages have been securitized
vary but may be as high as ninety percent. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing,
28 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 12 (2011).
19 BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 5 (2010). At the same time it faced an increased demand to provide
capital to new homeowners, the savings and loan industry was losing capital because of high
inflation, high interest rates, newly created investment vehicles, and no way to access a broader
pool of funds. Id. Additionally, the Community Reinvestment Act, in an effort to combat
redlining and help minority and low-income families achieve homeownership, required banks
to extend credit to individuals who never before qualified for loans. Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 802, 97 Stat. 1111, 1147 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012)).
This further increased the pool of borrowers in search of home loans. Id.
20 MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 19, at 7. This was not the first time the federal
government rode to rescue: during the Great Depression, when property values declined by
50% and financial institutions were unable to resell foreclosed properties, the federal
government produced an entire secondary mortgage market by creating new entities, like
Fannie Mae and the Federal Housing Administration, to buy up and insure mortgages from
struggling lenders. For a more complete history of the American mortgage market and the
development of modern mortgage products, see Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The
American Mortgage in Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 93, 94-
100 (2005).
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on Wall Street.21 Passage of federal legislation in the 1980s loosened
regulations on the secondary mortgage market,22 allowing for creation
of new securities derivatives and participation of private investment
firms,23which resulted in an explosion in the secondary mortgage
market.24
The shift from a primary to a secondary mortgage market changed
the borrower-lender relationship in two fundamental ways. First,
securitization eliminated the single lender entity that was both
financially invested in the performance of a loan and able to negotiate
directly with the borrower, and replaced it with an array of anonymous
investors. Second, once a homeowner's mortgage was sold and
repackaged on the secondary mortgage market as a security, the
responsibility for managing the loan rested not with the loan originator
but with a third party.25 This third party, called a loan servicer, was
21 MCLEAN &NOCERA, supra note 19, at 5, 7.
22 Secondary Market Mortgage Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, § 105, 110
Stat. 1689, 1691 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 1464(c)(1), 1757) (expanding the mortgage-backed
securities into the private sector buy allowing entities other than government sponsored
enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) to create mortgage-backed securities products); Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 671, 100 Stat. 2085, 2308-18 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 860A (2012)) (stopping multi-class securities, or tranched securities, from double taxation).
23 With securitization, lenders could sell the loan to investment banks. These banks created
and marketed to investors a variety of products derived from mortgage backed securities. Now,
instead of having to purchase an entire mortgage-backed security, investors could choose to
buy derivatives, or slices, of the bond based on how much risk the investors wanted to assume.
For a more detailed explanation of some derivative types, see Green & Wachter, supra note 20,
at 107-08 (citing FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
(2001)). See also Levitin & Twomey, supra note 18, at 21, for a description of how tranching
creates a hierarchy among investors based on default risk.
24 Bonds created from mortgages on single-family homes grew from zero to more than
$350 billion between 1970 and 1981, and by the end of 2001 were worth more than $3.3 trillion.
MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 19, at 8.
25 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 18, at 11. Levitin and Twomey provide a systematic
overview of the residential mortgage servicing business and how it differs from the traditional
portfolio lender business. Federal Reserve Board Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin offered the
following perspective:
Before securitization became commonplace, it was much more likely for a
mortgage to be serviced by the same entity that had originated the loan. This simple
approach ensured that lenders knew immediately if a homeowner was having
payment problems, and could take action to mitigate possible losses. A fair bit of this
kind of "portfolio servicing" still takes place, but as the residential real estate market
shifted from an originate-to-hold model to an originate-to-distribute model, an
industry of independent third-party entities emerged to service the loans on behalf of
the securitization trusts. These trusts, as a requirement for their tax-preferred status,
were supposed to be passive, with the management of individual loans left to the
servicer. These servicing arrangements are now commonplace in the industry: In
fact, the system has matured rapidly and experienced considerable consolidation over
the past twenty years.
Sarah Bloom Raskin, Remarks at the National Consumer Law Center's Consumer Rights
Litigation Conference (Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/raskin20101112a.htm.
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hired by the investor trust to manage the loan account in the investors'
best interests.26 Thus, with securitization, a triangulated relationship
between borrower, investors, and third-party loan servicer supplanted
the direct borrower-lender relationship.
As agents of investors, loan servicers have considerable
responsibility for managing a loan. The loan servicer issues monthly
statements, collects the homeowner's payments, places funds into
escrow accounts for taxes and insurance, remits funds to the investors,27
calculates interest rate adjustments for adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs), and reports to borrower credit information to national credit
bureaus.28 The loan servicer also serves as the homeowner's only contact
for any and all questions relating to paying back the loan. Finally, the
loan servicer is responsible for conducting the cost-benefit analysis for
delinquent loans and determining which option-pursuing foreclosure
or working out an alternative arrangement with the borrower-
minimizes the investors' losses. If the loan servicer pursues foreclosure
then it takes responsibility for adhering to the foreclosure laws of the
jurisdiction, hiring an attorney to file a foreclosure action in a judicial
foreclosure jurisdiction or follow the foreclosure notice and filing
instructions required by statute in nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions.
C. Problems with Securitized Loan Servicing
In theory, entrusting the responsibility for managing a loan to a
third party is practical, but in practice it has proven problematic.
Because of how the loan servicing industry is structured, loan servicers
are incentivized to foreclose rather than engage in a cost-benefit analysis
to determine the option that would most benefit investors' financial
26 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 18, at 16. Securitization separates the ownership (having
legal tide) from the management of mortgage loans. The trust, from which investors have
bought mortgage-backed securities, holds legal title to the mortgage. The loan servicer, usually
a third-party agent, is contractually responsible for acting on behalf of the investors by
collecting payments and passing along principal and interest payments to investors. MORTG.
BANKERS ASS'N, LENDERS' COST OF FORECLOSURE 3 (2008), available at http://www.mbaa.org/
files/Advocacy/2008/LendersCostofForeclosure.pdf.
27 The mortgagor payments are usually passed along to a trust that in turn distributes funds
to investors. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 18, at 23.
28 The loan servicing industry is largely unregulated and the unfolding of the foreclosure
crisis revealed many flaws, from predatory practices (padding of fees, strategic misapplication
of payments, and inaccurate assessment of homeowners' insurance) to conflicts of interest for
mega-servicers that are also investors in the mortgages they manage, and the robo-signing
scandal. See Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 53, 54-55 (2010) (statement
of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa) [hereinafter Problems in Mortgage
Servicing Hearing], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg65258/pdf/
CHRG-111shrg65258.pdf; id. at 358-60 (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System); Raskin, supra note 25.
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interests. As a consequence, little communication occurs between loan
servicers and borrowers. This is especially problematic when a loan is
delinquent and communication is critical to determine whether
foreclosure is the best option.
1. Loan Servicer Preference for Foreclosure
Loan servicers prefer foreclosure for two main reasons. The first
involves the automated way in which loan servicers conduct business.
The transactional part of loan servicing, sending out billing statements
and collecting payments, is an automated process that can be done at
minimal cost and with minimal human intervention.29 The problem is
that even managing defaulted loans is highly automated so that the cost-
benefit analysis once conducted by a loan agent at the savings and loan
is replaced by computer software. The loan servicer enters a code
indicating that a loan is delinquent and the computer automatically
selects a previously approved attorney, generates and uploads the
documents required for filing the foreclosure, and forwards them to the
attorney.30 Once the property is foreclosed and liquidated, the servicer
automatically bills the investor entity for the cost of the foreclosure.31 As
a result of automation, loan servicing companies have few people on the
payroll with the requisite knowledge and skills to conduct loss
mitigation or non-retention analysis for an individual borrower's loan.
Secondly, loan servicers rely on foreclosure instead of other loss
mitigation tactics because of the loan servicing industry's business
model. Loan servicers make their profit by maximizing the fees earned
from managing the loan and minimizing associated costs, hence
automation.32 Servicers rarely have an ownership interest in the loan
29 The Foreclosure Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform,
112th Cong. 47, 51 (2011) (statement of Mark A. Kaufman, Commissioner of Financial
Regulation, State of Maryland) [hereinafter Foreclosure Crisis Hearing], available
at http://oversight.house.gov/wp content/uploads/2012/04/3-8-11 -Full-Committee-Hearing-
Transcript.pdf. Levitin and Twomey report that the annual cost of servicing a single, current
loan, not including technology investment or corporate overhead, is between $36-$47 per loan.
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 18, at 25 (citing Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green,
Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 4 (Freddie Mac,
Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/pdf/fmwp-
0403_servicing.pdf).
30 In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 627 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009), rev'd, 2010 WL 624909 (E.D. Pa.
2010), affd in part, rev'd in part, 655 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2011).
31 When a loan goes into delinquency, the servicer has to make advances of principal and
interest to the investors, whether or not payments from the borrower are received. The servicer
also covers the cost of taxes, insurance, property preservation, inspection and legal costs. These
advance costs are reimbursed after the foreclosure is completed. FRUMKIN, supra note 13, at 3;
Raskin, supra note 25.
32 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 18, at 5. Such fees include a percentage of the unpaid
balance, fees charged to borrowers, interest income on borrower payments, and any business
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and therefore do not stand to lose money if the loan fails.33 In fact, loan
servicers lose money if poor performing loans are kept on their books. If
a loan is delinquent, then the servicer usually has to advance interest,
and possibly principal payments, to the investor trust. 34 The loan
servicer is then reimbursed for these payment advances after the
foreclosed property is liquidated. There is little room in this financial
structure for the cost-benefit analysis needed for loss mitigation, which
requires loan servicers to pay fixed overhead costs and out-of-pocket
expenses that may not be recouped from the investor trust.35 As a result,
servicers' incentives are not completely aligned with investors' interests;
servicers will favor options that are less labor intensive and require little
cost upfront, such as foreclosure, even if a more labor intensive option,
such as modification, better preserves investors' interests.36 Whether or
not a specific loan servicer is incentivized to foreclose or not depends on
the servicing agreement between the loan servicer and the investor
trust.37 Therefore, each loan servicer must make a different assessment
when deciding whether to foreclose or whether to consider seriously a
homeowner's request for loss mitigation analysis.38
arrangements connected to the loan servicer, such as insurance, property valuation, and
inspection. DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE
WHEN THEY SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR: SERVICER
COMPENSATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 2-5 (2009), available at http://www.macdc.org/
research/Servicer-Reportl009.pdf.
33 THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 1.
34 Id. at 26 (providing examples of loan servicers who had to make advancements, such as
Prospectus Supplement, IndyMac, MBS, Depositor, Indymac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
FLX5).
35 These costs, estimated to be $750-$1000 go into the time required to contact borrowers,
collect and verify data, obtain home value estimates, determine whether the borrower's setback
is temporary or permanent, coordinate with any second-lien holders, and estimate the net
present value of the loan for each loss mitigation alternative. Generally, out-of-pocket expenses
can be charged to investors, but not overhead for the loan servicer staff conducting the analysis.
See id. at 27; Cordell et al., supra note 12, at 15-17.
36 Cordell et al., supra note 12, at 7, 18. Another complicating factor is that some investors
with an interest in a loan may be better served by foreclosure and other investors with an
interest in the same loan may be better served by loan modification. EDWARD VINCENT
MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34386, COULD SECURITIZATION OBSTRUCT VOLUNTARY
LOAN MODIFICATIONS AND PAYMENT FREEZES? 5 (2008); Cordell, supra note 12, at 21-22.
37 Depending on the terms of the servicing agreement, loan servicers can have significant
leeway or can be quite restricted as to the extent to which they can modify the homeowner's
loan agreement.
38 While many servicers are capable of making affordable loan modifications, the largest
servicers such as Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo proved unwilling to do
so on a large enough scale to impact long term foreclosure trends. Among these large servicers,
some approved modifications at rates two to three times higher than other servicers. GEOFF
WALSH, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., REBUILDING AMERICA: HOW STATES CAN SAVE MILLIONS
OF HOMES THROUGH FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 5 (2012), available at http://www.nclc.org/
images/pdf/foreclosure mortgage/mediation/report-foreclosure-mediation.pdf.
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2. Communication Failures Between Borrowers
and Loan Servicers
A fundamental lack of communication and transparency is an
additional obstacle for borrowers seeking to avoid foreclosure. Because
loan servicing is primarily automated, much of its business has been
outsourced overseas, with representatives reachable only by fax or
phone.39 The industry is notorious for its lack of customer service,
further fueling the confusion that abounded with the escalation of the
foreclosure crisis. Anecdotes abound40 of homeowners who spent over a
year submitting and resubmitting loan modification applications, only
to discover that the applications were lost or improperly denied,41 or
that a foreclosure sale had already been scheduled.42 Homeowners
requested loan modifications only to be offered a plan with higher
monthly payments than the original43 or, after successfully completing
temporary modification plans, homeowners waited in limbo for months
to receive a final modification plan but then were inexplicably denied.44
Sometimes the reasons for the denials were not the fault of the
homeowner: paperwork and documents were lost, loan servicers did not
comply with their promised time frames for reviewing modification
39 Problems in Mortgage Servicing Hearing, supra note 28, at 53, 54 (statement of Thomas J.
Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa).
40 The Attorneys General who constituted the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group
tried to collect empirical data but had difficulty extracting loss mitigation data from national
banks. Id. The published reports can be found online on the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors website. State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK
SUPERVISORS, http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/Pages/SFPWG.aspx (last visited May 12, 2013).
41 Foreclosure Crisis Hearing, supra note 29, at 52 (statement of Mark A. Kaufman,
Commissioner of Financial Regulation, State of Maryland); Problems in Mortgage Servicing
Hearing, supra note 28, at 126, 135-37 (statement of Diane E. Thompson, National Consumer
Law Center). For a particularly egregious account of loan servicer incompetence, see Joe
Nocera, Shamed into Altering a Mortgage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at BI, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/economy/22nocera.html.
42 Loan servicers pursue loan modification and foreclosure simultaneously in what is called
"dual tracking." When a loan becomes delinquent, the file is sent to both the loss mitigation
department to be assessed for a loan modification and to the liquidation department for
foreclosure. Communication failures between the departments mean that one hand does not
know what the other is doing, causing intense stress and confusion for homeowners.
Foreclosure Crisis Hearing, supra note 29, at 52-53 (statement of Mark A. Kaufman,
Commissioner of Financial Regulation, State of Maryland). Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
recently put an end to "dual tracking" for delinquent mortgages they own or guarantee so that
loan servicers cannot proceed with foreclosure if they are engaged in good faith negotiations for
loan modification. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Authority, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
Align Guidelines for Servicing Delinquent Mortgages (Apr. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21190/SAI42811Final.pdf.
43 David Bornstein, When Lenders Won't Listen, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Dec. 10,
2010, 10:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/when-lenders-wont-listen.
44 Problems in Mortgage Servicing Hearing, supra note 28, at 126, 135-37 (statement of
Diane E. Thompson, National Consumer Law Center).
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applications, or one division of the loan servicer continued to pursue
foreclosure proceedings while another division was reviewing a
modification or the borrower was in the midst of a trial modification
period.45
In addition to the difficulties in communicating with loan
servicers, homeowners with delinquent loans tend not to take the
initiative to reach out to their loan servicers to seek assistance. A poll of
2,031 adult homeowners conducted by Freddie Mac in 2005, before the
foreclosure crisis, revealed that over half of borrowers in foreclosure
proceedings had no contact with their lender or lender's representative
before receiving a notice of foreclosure. 46 Their reasons for not
contacting their lender ranged from feeling embarrassed and scared,*7 to
not knowing whom to call, or to being unaware of services their loan
servicer could provide, such as talking with a housing counselor,
entering into a forbearance agreement, or engaging in loss mitigation.48
The poll also found that, in comparison to homeowners in good
standing, these delinquent homeowners were generally younger and less
affluent as well as less likely to have prior experience with home
ownership.49 When homeowners did contact their loan servicers, they
had no single point of contact at the loan servicer. They spoke to
different people at different call centers each time, and as a consequence
frequently received misinformation or conflicting recommendations. 50
45 Id. at 139-43.
46 FREDDIE MAC, FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE RESEARCH 2 (2005), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/service/msp/pdf/foreclosure-avoidance-dec2005.pdf.
47 A Harris Interactive poll asked 1334 homeowners in the United States to describe how
they would feel if foreclosure were likely for them. They answered: "scared" (38%), "depressed"
(35%), "angry" (9%), "embarrassed" (8%), or "none of these" (9%). NEIGHBORWORKS AM.,
FORECLOSURE STATISTICS 1 (2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/comein/files/
foreclosurestatistics.pdf. A 2007 study conducted by the Neighborhood Housing Services of
Chicago asked housing counselors to explain why borrowers fail to contact their loan servicer
when they have trouble making payment: "53% responded that most borrowers do not
understand that lenders can provide options and 26% suggested that borrowers are too stressed
or depressed to take any action. About 10% of counselors wrote that borrowers avoid their
lender because they feel mistreated or belittled during interactions with their lender."
NEIGHBORHOOD HouS. SERV. OF CHI., INC., LESSONS FROM THE FRONT LINES: COUNSELOR
PERSPECTIVES ON DEFAULT INTERVENTIONS 7 (2007), available at http://www.nhschicago.org/
images/uploads/pages/LessonsFrontLinesOct2OO7.pdf.
48 Only with some prompting, did homeowners express awareness of other services, such as
repayment plans, adding missed payments to the existing loan balance, changing the interest
rate, extending the mortgage, switching from an adjustable-rate to a fixed-rate mortgage, or
making a lump-sum payment. FREDDIE MAC, supra note 46, at 7, 9-10.
49 Id. at 3.
50 See Problems in Mortgage Servicing Hearing, supra note 28, at 126, 135-37 (statement of
Diane E. Thompson, National Consumer Law Center); Nocera, supra note 41.
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D. Inadequacy of Conventional Legal Procedure
in the Foreclosure Crisis
The two primary problems with loan servicer behavior-the
preference to foreclose and failures in communication-frequently
resulted in unnecessary foreclosures or foreclosures that were not in
investors' financial interest. As discussed above, conventional legal
procedures presume that a financially motivated lender is making the
decision to foreclose, not a third-party loan servicer with its own
interests. Unfortunately, it only became evident that conventional legal
procedures failed to provide an appropriate check on loan servicer
behavior once a record number of homeowners began defaulting in
2008, precipitating a national foreclosure crisis.
1. Securitization and Loan Servicer Behavior Contributed
to the Crisis
The national foreclosure crisis unfolded as a result of a confluence
of factors, including securitization and loan servicer behavior. The
record number of foreclosures that began in 2008 was related to the
record number of homeowners with securitized mortgages. The rise in
home values in the late 1990s made mortgage-backed securities a
profitable investment in high demand. The demand for mortgage-
backed securities in turn spurred a proliferation of exotic subprime
mortgage products51 and an industry keen to sell them.52 With these
51 Exotic loan products include hybrid adjustable-rate mortgage loans (ARMs), which
enable a borrower to pay the loan at a below-market fixed interest rate for a set period of time,
after which the rate continually resets to the market rate for the life of the loan. "Option ARMs"
let borrowers choose from different payment options each month-whether a minimum
payment, interest-only payment, fully amortizing thirty-year payment, or fully amortizing
fifteen-year payment. "Balloon loans" allow borrowers to make low, fixed monthly payments
for a short period of time, after which the borrower must pay the remainder in a lump sum.
"Interest-only loans" allow borrowers to pay only the accrued interest on their loans for a fixed
grace period, after which borrowers begin repaying the principal with significantly higher
monthly payments. "Deferred interest loans" or "negative amortization loans" allow borrowers
to make monthly payments that are less than what they owe in interest and principal. This
often increases, rather than decreases, the size of the loan especially since these loans have
payment and interest rate adjustment caps which keep payments the same even if interest rates
rise. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE STRATEGIES TO
ADDRESS FORECLOSURES 5 (2007), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/
pdf/0709FORECLOSURES.PDF.
52 Beginning in the early 2000s, the mortgage market incentivized an "originate-to-
distribute" model. Under this model, mortgage brokers originated loans, then sold them to
institutions that securitized them, which in turn, sold them to investors on the secondary
mortgage market. As a consequence, brokers did not suffer any losses if the borrowers
defaulted, reducing their incentive to screen applicants carefully and increasing their incentive
to generate new loans. Christopher J. Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults 3 (Fed.
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subprime mortgage products, people who never before qualified for
mortgages could obtain subprime loans to buy a home53 and current
homeowners could convert their home equity into cash by refinancing
their existing mortgages.5 4 At the time, homeownership was considered
an investment that would always yield a return because no one expected
housing prices to fall. Homeowners in financial difficulty would not
default because they could always sell their home to pay off their loans.
Nationwide, homeownership increased from 64.2% in 1994 to a record
69.2% in 2004, an additional twelve million people owning homes.55
When the mortgage market began to suffer in 2006 from slowing
house price appreciation and a sharp increase in defaults,56 largely due
to resetting interest rates for subprime ARMs, a record number of
homeowners found they could not keep up with payments and
defaulted on their loans. 7 Due in part to the automated practices of the
loan servicing industry, loan defaults translated automatically to
foreclosure. This first wave of foreclosure filings and subsequent
Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2008-59, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2008/200859/200859pap.pdf.
53 "Subprime" or "near-prime" mortgages are generally targeted to borrowers who have
problematic credit history, minimal savings, and/or an inability or unwillingness to document
assets or income. The number of newly originated sub-prime mortgages almost doubled
between 2003 and 2005, jumping from 1.1 million to 1.9 million. Id. at 3-4 (detailing the
attributes of subprime, near-prime, and prime mortgage products, and explaining why
delinquency and default rose so sharply through 2008). The vast majority of subprime loans
were targeted at racial minorities, even though some of these homeowners qualified for less
expensive loans. Winnie F. Taylor, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in the Subprime Mortgage
Market: Proposals for Fair Lending Reform, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 263 (2009).
54 JOSH ROSNER, GRAHAM FISHER & Co., HOUSING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: A HOME
WITHOUT EQUITY IS JUST A RENTAL WITH DEBT 19-21 (2001), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1162456 (predicting that, as rising real estate values
increased the equity value of the home, more and more American consumers would draw down
their home-equity in order to maintain a particular lifestyle). For detailed reporting on the
interface between the housing industry and the subprime mortgage industry in Florida leading
up to the foreclosure crisis, see George Packer, The Ponzi State, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2009, at
81.
55 MARK DoMs & MERYL MOTIKA, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., No. 2006-30, FRBSF
ECONOMIC LETTER: THE RISE IN HOMEOWNERSHIP (2006), available at http://www.frbsf.org/
publications/economicslletter/2006/el2OO6-30.html; Historical Census of Housing Tables,
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/
owner.html (last updated Oct. 31, 2011).
56 Between 1979 and 2006, the share of mortgage loans that were "seriously delinquent," or
ninety days or more past due or in the process of foreclosure, averaged 1.7%. By the second
quarter of 2008, the share jumped to 4.5%. Mayer et al., supra note 52, at 2 (citing data from the
Mortgage Bankers Association).
57 The share of seriously delinquent subprime residential mortgages increased from 5.6% in
mid-2005 to over 21% in 2008. Mayer et al., supra note 52, at 3. In 2007, approximately 852,000
foreclosures were opened for subprime mortgages and approximately 553,000 foreclosures were
opened for prime mortgages, totaling approximately 1,558,000 foreclosures. Cordell et al., supra
note 12, at 7 (using data from the Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey
to estimate inventory of subprime and prime mortgages from 2004-2007 and the first two
quarters of 2008).
1904
2013] ADR'S PLACE IN FORECLOSURE 1905
foreclosure sales flooded the housing market and caused property values
to spiral downward. Many homes were now worth less than the loans
and investments they secured.58 By 2008, the investment losses created
by these foreclosures and the sinking housing market resulted in the
collapse of a number of financial institutions and launched a Great
Recession.59 With recession came unemployment and a second wave of
foreclosures for homeowners unable to afford mortgage payments and
unable to sell in a market already saturated with homes.60
The quantity of foreclosures and consequent financial losses are
staggering. The numbers of residential mortgage loans entering
foreclosure jumped from 800,000 in 2005,61 when housing prices were
still rising, to 2.8 million in 2009 and 2.9 million in 2010. Of the nearly
eight million homes that entered foreclosure since mid-2007, loan
servicers repossessed over three million.62 The total losses to individual
families that have been foreclosed upon are projected to exceed $2.6
58 When the value of a home is less than the value of the mortgage, meaning that selling the
home at market value cannot pay off the loan, the property has no equity and is considered
"underwater." In 2011, sixty percent of all homes in Nevada were underwater and the
percentages of homes underwater in Arizona and Florida were forty-eight percent and forty-
five percent, respectively. WALSH, supra note 38, at 33 (citing CoreLogic data on negative equity
from September 13, 2011). For many homeowners whose houses are underwater, the property
is also "overleveraged," meaning that the homeowners owe so much on the mortgage that they
are unable to pay the interest payments for the loan. The first wave of foreclosures occurred
because homeowners were overleveraged and could not keep up with the ARM payments when
interest rates reset. The drop in the housing market caused many more homes to be underwater
because the amount owed on the loan exceeded the market value of the home.
59 To help banks survive the Great Recession, the federal government disbursed $475 billion
in bailouts under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a figure
lower than the $700 billion originally envisioned by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 1302, 124 Stat. 1376, 2133 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 5225(a) (2006)).
60 GETTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 11.
61 Problems in Mortgage Servicing Hearing, supra note 28, at 352, 353 (statement of Sheila
C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) (citing an FDIC estimate based on
data from the Mortgage Bankers Association data and the American Housing Survey).
According to RealtyTrac estimates, in 2010, 2.23% of all U.S. housing units received at least one
foreclosure filing, up from 2.21% in 2009, 1.84% in 2008, 1.03% in 2007 and 0.58% in 2006.
Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in
December, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/
record-29-million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low- in-
december-6309.
62 Problems in Mortgage Servicing Hearing, supra note 28, at 102, 102 (statement of Adam J.
Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (citing HOPE Now
Data Reports). The National Fair Housing Alliance studied how financial institutions care for
properties on which they have foreclosed. The study found that real estate owned properties in
African-American or Latino neighborhoods were not as well-maintained or marketed for sale,
as in areas with a large White population, making it harder for minority neighborhoods to
recover. NAT'L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, HERE COMES THE BANK, THERE GOES OUR
NEIGHBORHOOD: How LENDERS DISCRIMINATE IN THE TREATMENT OF FORECLOSED HOMES
(2011), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/There%2OGoes%200ur%
2 0
Neighborhood%20-%20REO%20report.pdf.
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trillion with additional trillions in losses to neighborhoods and
communities.63 Foreclosures have not only harmed homeowners and
communities, but also those who invested in mortgage backed
securities. 64
2. Legal Procedures Failed to Protect Homeowners and Investors
Existing foreclosure processes in all states were simply not
equipped to handle the record numbers of foreclosures, the collapsed
housing market, and the triangulated relationship between borrowers,
loan servicers, and investors. Securitization changed how foreclosure
decisions were made. As a result, a basic presumption of conventional
foreclosure laws no longer applied and instead millions of foreclosures
occurred without a cost-benefit analysis to determine the best option for
recouping the value of the loan. Borrowers and investors suffered the
consequences and local and national economies suffered.
The sheer volume of foreclosures was overwhelming and
compromised the integrity of foreclosure proceedings. For example,
Florida's state courts were flooded with cases: during the month of
April, 2009, one in every 135 housing units received a foreclosure filing
notice.65 In Florida's Twentieth Judicial Circuit, the court created a
63 Problems in Mortgage Servicing Hearing, supra note 28, at 126, 130 (statement of Diane
E. Thompson, National Consumer Law Center) (citing STAFF OF THE J. ECON. COMM., 110th
Cong., 2d Sess., STATE BY STATE FIGURES: FORECLOSURE AND HOUSING WEALTH LOSSES
(2008)). Communities suffer from foreclosure because vacant, foreclosed properties lower the
value of neighboring properties. Local governments lose tax revenue and also have increased
costs associated with unpaid sewer and water bills and handling building code violations from
unmaintained properties. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-34, VACANT
PROPERTIES: GROWING NUMBER INCREASES COMMUNITIES' COSTS AND CHALLENGES 27-48
(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586089.pdf.
64 Foreclosing on a home with a loan balance at the national median in 2008 resulted in
around an average loss to investors of $145,000 per home foreclosure. See WALSH, supra note
38, at 33 (citing Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of the 2008
Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1107 (2009)). All types of
investors have interests in mortgage-backed securities, from the big banks to pension funds to
private endowments. See Robert Lenzer, Lessons Learned a Year After Lehman's Demise,
FORBES (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/21/bernanke-bailout-paulson-
personal-finance-investing-ideas-lehman-brothershtml
65 Florida, a judicial foreclosure state, was one of the states hit earliest and hardest by the
foreclosure crisis. In April 2009, three of the ten metropolitan areas in the United States with
the highest foreclosure rates were in Florida. JAKABOVICS & COHEN, supra note 9, at 22 (citing
Foreclosure Activity Remains at Record Levels in April, REALTYTRAC (May 12, 2009),
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activity-remains-at-record-
levels-in- april-4883. The percent increases in foreclosure filings in Florida's judicial circuits
between 2006-2008 is astounding: 230% (First Circuit), 444% (Ninth Circuit), 474% (Eleventh
Circuit), 631% (Twelfth Circuit), 496% (Fifteenth Circuit), 387% (Eighteenth Circuit), 550%
(Nineteenth Circuit), and a whopping 788% (Twentieth Circuit). Id. at 24-25.
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"rocket docket"66 and called judges out of retirement to assist with a
docket deluged by more than 1000 cases per day.67 Most hearings lasted
for less than one minute because judges asked homeowners only two
questions: "Are you current on your mortgage?" and "Are you living in
your home?" If the answers were "no" and "yes," then homeowners were
given sixty days to vacate the premises. 68 Little to no time was spent by
the judge assessing the merits of the foreclosure petition, such as
whether the entity seeking foreclosure had the legal right to do so and
whether it had complied with state law.69
The conventional foreclosure process does not require a cost-
benefit analysis of whether the securitized loan is performing in
accordance with the investors' financial interest. It lacks this assessment
step because it dates to a primary mortgage market era when a lender
and borrower had the ability to interact closely. Borrowers and investors
in a secondary mortgage market lack this close relationship and
therefore cannot respond to market changes that negatively impact the
value of the collateral and that were not anticipated at the time the
mortgage originated. For example, loan servicers continued to foreclose
even after the flood of homes on the market decreased the value of
homes markedly and eviscerated the value of investors' interests.
Although conventional foreclosure proceedings failed to protect
borrowers or investors, it proved difficult for states to find a solution to
the problem. Securitization made foreclosure a national economic
activity difficult for individual states to regulate. There was no blanket
legislation that could be passed to end foreclosures entirely and reset
mortgages to reflect market realities. Foreclosure is a contractual
remedy for lenders when a loan is delinquent and, although state
governments could delay foreclosure,70 they could not deny lenders the
right to foreclose. 71 Furthermore, the financial situation of each
66 JAKABOVICS & COHEN, supra note 9, at 22.
67 Michael Corkery, A Florida Court's "Rocket Docket" Blasts Through Foreclosure Cases,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12349175514
0004565.html. There are accounts of loan servicer lawyers using hand trucks to exchange boxes
of legal documents from the morning cases with the boxes of afternoon cases. See JAKABOVICS
& COHEN, supra note 9, at 22.
68 Corkery, supra note 67.
69 The robo-signing scandal is a prime example of how foreclosure procedures broke down
during the foreclosure crisis. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-433,
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REVEAL NEED FOR ONGOING
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 1, 11-12 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/
317923.pdf.
70 Many states passed moratoria on foreclosure after the robo-signing scandal was
uncovered. Bank of America also put a moratorium on housing foreclosures in all fifty states so
that it could investigate the documents being used to justify homeowner evictions.
71 At the very least, the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution
restrict the extent to which federal and state governments can enact laws controlling mortgage
foreclosures. See Geoff Walsh, The Finger in the Dike: State and Local Laws Combat the
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homeowner and the reasons for being in default were highly
individualized, making it extremely difficult for a legislature to develop
a law tailored narrowly enough to achieve its compelling interest to
protect homeowners by the least restrictive means possible. Thus, state
and local governments focused on ways to restructure foreclosure
procedures for homeowners who were either struggling with making
mortgage payments or were already delinquent. One way in which
governments restructured foreclosure procedure was to include ADR as
a step in the foreclosure process.
II. AN ADR RESPONSE TO CRISIS
The use of ADR can restore integrity to foreclosure procedures by
ensuring that only necessary foreclosures take place, ultimately averting
further crisis and stabilizing the economy. Incorporating an ADR-based
negotiation step in conventional foreclosure proceedings counteracts
the automated practices of the loan servicing industry by making the
loan servicer consider the value of the loan based on the local housing
market and the borrower's ability to make future payments. Through a
structured negotiation process, the borrower and loan servicer together
create a solution that considers new market realities and provides a plan
of action that satisfies the needs of homeowners and investors.
State and local governments established foreclosure ADR programs
with clear objectives that directly respond to the problems associated
with securitized loan servicing that contributed to the foreclosure
crisis.72 To further these objectives, programs target homeowners with
delinquent loans and give them an opportunity to sit down with the
loan servicers73 and negotiate alternatives to foreclosure.
Foreclosure Tide, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 139 (2011) (providing a historical survey of the
constitutionality of state moratoria on foreclosure as well as an analysis the constitutionality of
state foreclosure mediation programs).
72 Using ADR as a way for parties in conflict to develop solutions tailored to their interests
is not a novel concept; however, these programs are unique in that they are being employed as a
public policy initiative to respond where existing laws have proven inadequate. Courts have
encouraged ADR to help manage crowded dockets and also to make it possible for parties to
settle disputes themselves, rather than by relying on a judge. It is increasingly common for
parties to elect to use an ADR process to resolve conflicts privately, rather than going to court.
However, parties usually turn to an ADR process because the default, going to court, is public,
more expensive, and time intensive, not because the default lacks integrity, which is what
happened to foreclosure proceedings during the foreclosure crisis.
73 For these programs, "lender" and "loan servicer" are interchangeable. Where program
rules or statutory language refer to the obligations of a lender entity, it is understood that, for
securitized loans, it is the loan servicer who will be required to comply.
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A. Foreclosure ADR Program Objectives
There are five primary objectives of foreclosure ADR programs
that attempt to respond to the problems associated with securitized loan
servicing and the foreclosure crisis. They are to 1) resolve
communication barriers caused by securitization, 2) provide oversight
of loan servicers' conduct, 3) educate homeowners about their rights in
foreclosure, 4) assist with a high volume of cases in court, and 5)
alleviate community blight. Frequently, a particular ADR program
works to further several of these objectives simultaneously.
In order to overcome communication barriers, a fundamental
problem at the heart of the foreclosure crisis, foreclosure ADR programs
physically bring borrowers and loan servicers together for a
conversation about the loan. Some programs assemble parties and
expressly instruct them to talk about the possibility of modifying or
restructuring of the loan so that unnecessary foreclosures do not
occur.74 Where loss-mitigation is not an option, the parties are directed
to explore non-retention plans that allow the lender to take title of the
property without having to foreclose. Connecticut's foreclosure
mediation program, the first, state-wide program in the country, 75
provides a good illustration. Of primary concern to the Connecticut
legislature was the fact that individuals and communities would suffer76
because many homeowners were failing to take the initiative to reach
out to lenders and engage in negotiations around a loan modification or
alternative to foreclosure.77 Connecticut's mediation program empowers
74 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1(1)(3) (West 2012) ("[P]arties and the
mediator shall address loss mitigation programs that may be applicable to the loan secured by
the mortgage or deed of trust that is the subject of the foreclosure action."); NEV. FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION R. 1.1. The general purpose of Nevada's foreclosure mediation program is to
"[encourage] deed of trust beneficiaries (lenders) and homeowners (borrowers) to exchange
information and proposals that may avoid foreclosure." Id. 1.2.
75 A Connecticut law entitled, "An Act Concerning Responsible Lending and Economic
Security," was a large consumer protection bill that, in addition to creating a foreclosure
mediation program, gave the Connecticut Banking Department the regulatory tools to more
closely supervise mortgage lenders and crack down on predatory lending as well as an
Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program. 2008 Conn. Acts, Public Act No. 08-176 (Reg. Sess.).
76 The comments of Representative Barry (Twelfth District), Chair of the Banks
Committee, convey the real fears, shared by many people around the country, that the
foreclosure crisis would bring poverty, homelessness, blight, and further economic damage.
CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., TRANSCRIPT OF HOUSE DEBATE ON H.R. 5577 (May 5, 2008) [hereinafter
CONN. HOUSE DEBATE OF H.R. 5577], available at http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dtsearch.asp?
cmd=getdoc&Docld=23039&Index=I%3A\zindex\2008&HitCount=0&hits=&hc=0&req=
&Item=2791.
77 Representative Barry stated during the debate:
No amount of marketing is going to get a borrower ... to reach out to the
lender to discuss their [sic] options. The mediation program will serve the purpose of
identifying people who can be helped and directing them to the right resources to
keep them in their home.
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the state and the judiciary to direct homeowners and borrowers to have
a structured conversation, presided over by a neutral mediator, about
whether there are any alternatives to proceeding with a foreclosure.78
The legislature outlined the topics to be addressed during mediation:
"all issues of foreclosure, including, but not limited to, reinstatement of
the mortgage, assignment of law days, assignment of sale date,
restructuring of the mortgage debt and foreclosure by decree of sale."79
In creating foreclosure ADR programs, state and local
governments also tried to create a mechanism to oversee loan servicers'
compliance with federal loan modification programs 80 and to ensure
that loan servicers indeed have the legal right to foreclose on the
property. Federal loan modification standards are established by the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP);81 many state and
local programs fold HAMP analysis into the ADR process. HAMP
creates incentives82 for loan servicers to restructure home mortgages for
But I think this is the best way to put people who are in foreclosure, who have
been given foreclosure notices. They oftentimes don't respond to their mail. They
have a pride issue, maybe sometimes their dignity doesn't allow them to respond to a
complaint in the mail and the clock's ticking.
CONN. HOUSE DEBATE OF H.R. 5577, supra note 76 (statement of Representative Ryan P. Barry,
12th District).
78 See id.
79 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31m. (2013).
80 Many loan servicers failed to comply with HAMP requirements. Homeowners around
the country reported difficulty in working with their loan servicers because information was
inconsistent and confusing, loan servicers lost documents or made repeated requests for
documents already submitted, and improperly calculated borrowers' income or misapplied
HAMP guidelines. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-367R, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: RESULTS OF HOUSING COUNSELORS SURVEY ON BORROWERS' EXPERIENCES
WITH THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 5-6, 8 (2011). Homeowners often
waited four to six months for a decision from a loan servicer about a HAMP application. Id. at
6. During this waiting period, penalties and late fees on a delinquent loan accrued and made it
harder to cure. Where a trial modification was granted, many homeowners were still denied
permanent modifications even after successfully completing the trial modification period. Id. at
8.
81 As part of the federal response to the foreclosure crisis, President Obama rolled out a
"Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan." The plan has three parts: refinancing, loan
modification, and strengthening of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. A primary component of the
plan, the Making Home Affordable Program, which took effect in late February, 2009, focused
on helping homeowners at risk of foreclosure secure refinancing or modification of loans
through either the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) or the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP). See Obama Administration's Home Mortgage Crisis Fact Sheet,
WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/
18/AR2009021801159.html. Both HAMP and HARP give incentives for loan servicers to either
modify or refinance mortgages for people whose homes have lost value. See FANNIE
MAE, HOME AFFORDABLE REFINANCE (DU REFI PLUS AND REFI PLUS) FAQS
(2013), https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/mha/mharefi/pdf/refinancefaqs.pdf; Home Affordable
Refinance Program (HARP), MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, http://www.making
homeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-rates/Pages/harp.aspx (last updated Apr. 12, 2013).
82 MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE
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eligible83 homeowners who are behind with payments or on their way
default. The intended effect of restructuring these loans is for
homeowners to stay in their homes with lower, sustainable monthly
mortgage payments. 84 Under HAMP, participating loan servicers
85 must
modify the loan so that a homeowner's monthly payments are no
greater than thirty-one percent of her gross monthly income.8 6 HAMP
also demands that participating loan servicers establish a single point of
contact for borrowers so that they can communicate with the same
individual about the particulars of their case, reducing the confusion of
mixed messages. 87 To ensure homeowners are considered for HAMP,
some foreclosure ADR give the parties explicit instructions for HAMP
analysis. For example, one program requires lenders to conduct a net-
present-value calculation as a precursor to mediation so that the parties
enter the mediation ready to discuss the homeowners' eligibility for
modification. 88 Many programs established after the robo-signing
scandal and loan servicer misconduct came to light, provide even more
oversight of loan servicers because they introduce additional
instructions, such as requiring loan servicers to confirm that the
MORTGAGES (2011), available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp-
servicer/mhahandbook__34.pdf. For example, Supplemental Directive 11-06 increased the dollar
amount loan servicers are eligible to receive for permanently modifying loans and created a
sliding scale so that servicers receive more money if they provide a permanent modification for
loans that are less than 120 days delinquent. See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM,
SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE 11-06: MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM-UPDATES TO
SERVICES INCENTIVES 1 (2011), https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_
servicer/sd 1 106.pdf.
83 Homeowners eligible for a loan modification under HAMP must occupy the property as
a primary residence, owe up to $729,750 on the current mortgage, and have a first mortgage
issued before January 1, 2009 with a monthly payment greater than thirty-one percent of the
gross monthly household income. See Home Affordable Modification Program, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/
Pages/hamp.aspx (last updated Mar. 21, 2013).
84 Borrowers who are eligible for HAMP must complete a ninety-day trial modification
period before the modification becomes permanent. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-i 1-367R, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: RESULTS OF HOUSING COUNSELORS SURVEY
ON BORROWERS' EXPERIENCES WITH THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 3
(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97516.pdf.
85 All loan servicers that received TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) funds must
participate in HAMP. Federal GSEs like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also participate in
HAMP.
86 MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, supra note 82, at 176.
87 See David Streitfeld, Servicers Said to Agree to Revamped Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2011, at B4.
88 For example, Vermont's foreclosure mediation statute requires lenders to calculate net
present value in accordance with HAMP guidelines and to produce, for the homeowner and the
mediator, the net present value inputs and outputs. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4633 (2010).
Vermont's statute anticipated what the Dodd-Frank Act would also require, which is that the
U.S. Treasury make available a web-based net-present-value calculator that the public could use
to determine the value of a home and whether the mortgage would qualify for a loan
modification under HAMP. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1482, 124 Stat.
1376, 2203 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5219a (2012)).
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foreclosing party has possession of the note and therefore the legal right
to foreclose, as part of a comprehensive oversight machinery.89
State and local governments also rely on foreclosure ADR
programs to educate homeowners about the foreclosure and loan
modification process. As discussed earlier, many delinquent
homeowners are generally younger, less affluent, and less likely to have
prior experience with home ownership than homeowners whose loans
are in good standing. 90 Furthermore, communicating with loan servicers
can be problematic, paperwork is lost and telephone calls are not
returned, the instructions for applying for a modification can be diffuse,
and the modification review process is often opaque. Almost all
foreclosure dispute resolution programs integrate housing counseling
approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)91 as a free service for borrowers delinquent on their loans and
facing foreclosure.92 Housing counselors educate homeowners about
their rights in foreclosure, explain the foreclosure process, and help
them communicate with their loan servicer about foreclosure
alternatives.
A fourth program goal of state and local governments utilizing
foreclosure ADR programs is to encourage cases to settle when
appropriate. This goal is especially important to judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions that require foreclosure actions to go through the courts.
Programs in these jurisdictions bring parties to the negotiation table to
discuss whether foreclosure is the only option available. Court dockets
89 See discussion on required document exchange infra Part II.F.
90 See supra text accompanying note 49.
91 HUD has had a Housing Counseling Assistance Program since the 1970s. Housing
counseling organizations are approved by HUD to educate millions of people on a variety of
housing related issues, from educating potential buyers about homeownership and mortgages,
to foreclosure prevention, budgeting, maintenance of mortgage payments post-purchase, and
counseling about reverse mortgages, rental, and homelessness. The number of homeowners
seeking assistance with foreclosure from housing counselors jumped by thirty-six percent from
2006-2009. For a full description of the Program and its involvement in responding to the
foreclosure crisis, see HUD and NeighborWorks Housing Counseling Oversight: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Ins., Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 89 (2011) (statement of Deborah C. Holston, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Single
Family Housing, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development). Congress recently
recognized the importance of housing counseling in allaying the foreclosure crisis by calling for
the creation of an Office of Housing Counseling as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1442, 124 Stat. 1376, 2163-65 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 3533 (2006)).
92 WALSH, supra note 38, at 5. Washington, for example, created its statewide foreclosure
mediation program in order to "encourage homeowners to utilize the skills and professional
judgment of housing counselors as early as possible in the foreclosure process" and "[p]rovide a
process for foreclosure mediation when a housing counselor or attorney determines that
mediation is appropriate." 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 580.
1912
2013] ADR'S PLACE IN FORECLOSURE 1913
are thus cleared of cases that can settle, thereby improving the efficiency
and timeliness of necessary foreclosures.93
Finally, state and local governments rely on foreclosure ADR
programs to fulfill the most essential of these objectives: stabilizing local
communities weakened by the foreclosure crisis. For example, the
municipal foreclosure mediation program in Providence, Rhode Island
provides a sweeping statement of policy. Citing the negative impact of
residential mortgage foreclosure actions that "give impetus to the
continuation, extension and aggravation of urban blight and decay,"94
the city ordinance explains that the purpose of the foreclosure
mediation program is:
[T]o protect the public health, safety and welfare by providing (a)
early, HUD-approved independent counseling agency-supervised
intervention in residential owner-occupied mortgage foreclosure
cases which will assure timely determination of eligibility under
various federal, state and local programs established to facilitate loan
work-out and other solutions to permit residential homeowners,
where possible, to retain their properties and permit lenders to move
forward to recordation of a deed and subsequent auction/sale of the
properties upon conclusion of the process. 95
93 For example, Ohio's model foreclosure mediation program is designed to "assist courts
in managing the explosion of foreclosure cases on their dockets for a more efficient
administration of justice while assisting Ohio's most vulnerable homeowners facing the
prospect of losing their homes." Foreclosure Mediation Program Now Available to Ohio Courts,
THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/PIO/news/
2008/foreclosure_020708.asp; see also In re a Foreclosure Mediation ADR Option-
Administrative Order No. 2009-00001 5 1, No. D-0101-CV-77-52749 (N.M. Dist. Ct. 1st Apr.
30, 2009) [hereinafter N.M. Admin. Order No. 2009-00001], available at http://www.nclc.orgl
images/pdf/foreclosure-mortgage/foreclosure-med-prog-by-state/nm-admin-order.pdf
(stating that the Foreclosure Mediation Pilot program is intended "to minimize case processing
time, save costs and expense for the parties, and assist the parties in resolving the issues by
working out new mortgage terms where possible or other agreements mutually acceptable to
both parties").
94 PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-214 (2011). The full policy statement is
compelling and illustrates the real sense of crisis gripping the community:
It is hereby declared that residential mortgage foreclosure actions, caused in part by
so called sub-prime mortgage lending and predatory lending practices as well as
rising interest rates, unemployment and underemployment, have negatively
impacted a substantial number of homeowners in the city, creating a foreclosure
crisis which endangers the economic stability of the city and the health and safety of
its citizens, as the increasing numbers of foreclosures lead to increases in unoccupied
and unattended buildings in the city and give impetus to the continuation, extension
and aggravation of urban blight and decay. More importantly, foreclosures cause the
unnecessary and unwanted displacement of a considerable number of homeowners
and tenants who desire to live and work in the city.
Id.
95 Id. § 13-215.
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B. Vital Characteristics Furthering ADR Program Objectives
In order to accomplish the aforementioned objectives, state and
local foreclosure ADR programs requiring borrowers and loan servicers
to negotiate a looming foreclosure action share two essential
characteristics. First, to be eligible for these programs borrowers must
be owner-occupiers of the property in jeopardy and that property must
be the borrower's primary residence.96 Second, the programs require
direct communication about the loan between the borrower and the
lender or loan servicer. In general, a representative of the lender, usually
an attorney hired by the loan servicer, must appear in person and must
have the authority to negotiate and modify the loan secured by the
mortgage. 97 Some programs allow the lender to engage in the
foreclosure negotiation by phone.98
Limiting these programs to borrowers who are owner-occupiers
facing foreclosure allows state and local governments to reach the
demographic most negatively affected by the foreclosure crisis. The
number of residential foreclosures has been unprecedented. The loss of
homeowners due to residential foreclosure and subsequent depletion of
communities continues to pose the greatest threat to economic stability
in the United States.99 By targeting homeowners who are actively living
in their homes under threat of foreclosure, jurisdictions further their
objectives of clearing court dockets, educating borrowers, and
stabilizing communities.
Additionally, the requirement that a representative of the lender
appear in person at the negotiation is a crucial component to helping
programs achieve the other two objectives, overcoming barriers to
communication and monitoring loan servicer conduct. The secondary
mortgage market, with its array of anonymous investors, makes it
impossible for a homeowner to negotiate with the entity or entities that
have a secured interest in the borrower's home. Compelling a single
individual, with a name, phone number, email address, and the
authority to negotiate the terms of the loan, to materialize and assess
96 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31k (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(12)(c) (2011);
Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program, Administrative Directive No. 2011-2
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Del. Admin. Directive 2011-2], available at
http://courts.delaware.gov/Superior/pdf/AdministrativeDirective.201l-2.pdf. By contrast,
Florida's program, which allowed owners of non-residential property to request mediation.
Revision of Mortgage Foreclosure Procedures, Administrative Order No. 2012-002 PA/PI-CIR,
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 6th Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.jud6.org/legalcommunity/Legal
Practice/AOSAndRules/aos/aos2Ol2/2012-002.htm.
97 See, e.g., NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 10(1)(a); see also MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 7-105.1(a)(3) (West 2012).
98 Nevada's program allows lenders to participate by phone only if they can show good
cause. NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 10(1)(a).
99 FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 3.
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foreclosure alternatives is perhaps the most powerful and effective tool
that these programs provide to homeowners.
III. FORECLOSURE ADR PROGRAM BEST PRACTICES
State and local governments have important decisions to make
about how to create, structure, and implement foreclosure ADR
programs so that they reach their primary objectives. When making
these decisions, it is useful to compare key components of existing
foreclosure ADR programs and identify best practices. By relying on
best practices, state and local governments are more likely to avoid
unnecessary foreclosures and have a maximum impact on allaying the
foreclosure crisis. In creating, structuring, and implementing
foreclosure ADR programs, state and local governments must consider
key program components ranging from how a program is created to
when the negotiation opportunity is introduced in the foreclosure
timeline and how homeowners become enrolled. They must also
consider who presides over the negotiations, whether they include
housing counseling and legal services, what information the program
requires from homeowners and loan servicers, whether there are
sanctions and judicial oversight, and how the program is funded.
In examining key components of existing foreclosure ADR
programs, a number of themes emerge to guide governments crafting
programs while trying to account for local realities. For example, state
and local governments must ensure both efficiency of process and a
meaningful opportunity for informed negotiation between the parties.
They also have to balance the scale of the program with the resources
available to administer it. Finally, the difference in sophistication
between homeowners and loan servicers can create a power imbalance
between the parties and raises concerns about how to best protect
homeowners in an ADR process.100
100 Scholars have written extensively on the dangers of "power imbalance" between parties in
litigation, mediation, and other ADR processes. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense
of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in
the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993); Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88
YALE L.J. 998 (1979); Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits
in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289 (2003); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute
Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569
(2007). There has been some attention to the use of ADR in foreclosure proceedings, but the
focus has been on whether mediation, in its most essential form, can protect borrowers. See
Shana H. Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the Homeowner's Right to Self-
Determination in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 109 (2010). A
question for further examination is whether fundamental principles of mediation align with
20131 1915
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A. Program Creation and Implementation
State and local governments can choose to create foreclosure ADR
programs by state statute, local ordinance, or judicial rule.101 Whether
the program was created by the state legislature, local government, or
courts is a function of factors such as the political will in the state, 102 the
authority of the municipal governments, and the statutory power
granted to the judiciary. 103 Nevertheless, there are some clear advantages
to creating a foreclosure ADR process through legislative action, rather
than judicial rule, in both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure states.
Judiciaries have the authority to create foreclosure ADR programs
by passing rules that regulate how foreclosure cases proceed through the
courts. Establishing a program by judicial rule may be more expedient
than the political process. However, when it comes to implementing a
foreclosure ADR program, judiciaries face limitations. First, the
program will apply exclusively to judicial foreclosure; eliminating
homeowners facing nonjudicial foreclosure may be a problem for states
that allow both forms of foreclosure. Second, the application of judicial
rules is usually left to decentralized local courts so there may be
program inconsistencies within the state. Given these realities, many
state judiciaries have created a model framework of best practices for
each local court to adopt. Compare, for example, the different
experiences of the foreclosure mediation programs created by state
judiciaries in Ohio104and Florida,105 both of which created a model
those of consumer protection.
101 Two programs were created through a partnership between a local law school and either
the judiciary or the Attorney General. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a judicial foreclosure state,
Chief Justice Jeffrey A..Kremers signed directive 09-14 to start a foreclosure mediation program
run and coordinated by the Marquette Law School. Foreclosure Procedures, Chief Judge
Directive 09-14 (Wis. Dist. Ct. 1st July 10, 2009). In Arizona, a non-judicial foreclosure state,
the Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor School of Law established a mediation
program for non-judicial foreclosures that are part of bankruptcy proceedings. See Foreclosure
Mediation Unit, Sandra Day O'Connor Sch. of Law, http://www.law.asu.edu/programs/
Programs/LodestarDisputeResolutionProgram/ForeclosureMediationUnit.aspx (last visited
May 16,2013).
102 A number of bills were introduced in state legislatures to create foreclosure mediation
programs but they have not passed: Wisconsin Senate Bill 255, introduced in August 2009;
Massachusetts House Bill 4003, introduced in February, 2009; Texas Senate Bill 1475 and
House Bill 3426, introduced in March 2009. GEOFF WALSH, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS: UPDATES AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
11-14 (2010).
103 While there is variation among the programs, generally the branch of government that
created the program is related to the dominant form of foreclosure used in the state (judicial or
non-judicial) as well as the objectives of the program.
104 The Supreme Court of Ohio, for example, developed an eleven-step model framework for
a foreclosure mediation program but left the decisions regarding program implementation to
each local jurisdiction. This framework approach proved successful because not every county
had enough mediators for all the cases, or the money to pay them. See Kevin Kemper, Courts
1916
2013] ADR'S PLACE IN FORECLOSURE 1917
foreclosure program for local courts to adopt. While Ohio allowed local
courts to modify the model according to available resources and local
needs, Florida required all local courts to implement the same model
across the state despite huge variability in local housing markets.106
However, after a little less than two years, the Supreme Court of Florida
terminated the statewide program, 107 due in large part to local courts'
inability to implement the model program. 08 In light of the experiences
in Ohio and Florida, a strong model program should be provided to
local courts but there should be some flexibility to allow for successful
implementation. And third, when a judiciary creates a program, its
choices for administering the program are limited either to pre-existing
judicial infrastructure or third-party vendors. 109 Judiciaries, unlike
Trying Foreclosure Mediation, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Dec. 24, 2007), http://www.biz
journals.com/columbus/stories/2007/12/24/storyl.html?page=all.
105 Final Report and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases at 2,
Administrative Order No. AOSC09-54 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Dec. 28,2009) [hereinafter Fla. Admin.
Order No. AOSC09-54], available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub-info/
documents/AOSC09-54_Foreclosures.pdf.
106 The uniform, statewide managed mediation program attempted to impose basic
standards for the multiple foreclosure diversion programs that had previously sprung up
around the state with widely varying structures and rules. See JAKABOVICS & COHEN, supra note
9, at 22; see also Administrative Order Establishing Circuit-Wide Homestead Foreclosure
Conciliation Program, No. 2008-15.1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 12th Nov. 25, 2008), available at
http://foreclosureacademytraining.com/wp-content/uploads/201 /1/AO-08-15. 1-November-
8-2008.pdf.
107 Managed Mediation Program for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases,
Administrative Order No. AOSC1l-44 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub-info/documents/foreclosureorders/12 -19-2011_
Order_- ManagedMediation.pdf. The Supreme Court of Florida cited the Task Force's report,
which
identified lack of communication between plaintiffs and borrowers as the most
significant issue impeding early resolution of foreclosure cases, and concluded that
effective case management and mediation techniques are the best methods the courts
can employ to ensure that such communications occur early enough in the case to
avoid wasted time and resources for the courts and the parties.
Fla. Admin. Ord. AOSC09-54, supra note 105, at 2; see also WALSH, supra note 102, at 63.
108 Implementation problems include lack of loan servicer compliance with the
requirements of the model program and insufficient publicity. Letter from William D. Palmer,
Chair of Assessment Workgroup, to Charles T. Canady, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Fla.,
Re: Managed Mediation Program for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases 4 (Oct. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Palmer Letter], available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub-info/
documents/Foreclosure/10-21-2011_WorkgroupFinal Report.pdf.
109 In Delaware, the judiciary oversees the administration of the foreclosure mediation
program itself, relying on pre-existing court personnel to handle scheduling of mediation
sessions and to determine who is qualified to mediate. Although the Delaware legislature
recently codified the state judiciary's administrative directive 2011-2, the judiciary still
administers the program. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5062C (2012). In Florida, the judiciary
contracted out the responsibility of administering and implementing the statewide-managed
mediation program to third-party providers. Qualifying providers included non-profit
organizations "'independent of the judicial branch, capable of sustained operation without
fiscal impact to the courts, [and] politically and professionally neutral' with a 'demonstrated
ability to efficiently manage the extremely high volume of foreclosure actions."' Guidance
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legislatures, cannot draw in other government entities to help with
collecting statistics for program evaluation,' 10 or handle payments (due
to statutory restrictions on the judiciary's ability to collect fees from
ADR).uli
State legislatures or city councils 112 have a lengthy political
process1 but, because legislatures control the purse strings and have
the power to deploy more state resources than the judiciary, programs
created by the legislature have the potential to be much more expansive
and perhaps more effectively administered. 114 Legislatures in both
nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions 115 and judicial foreclosure
Concerning Managed Mediation Programs for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases,
Administrative Order No. AOSC10-57 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 2010) [hereinafter Fla. Admin. Order
No. AOSC10-57], available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/adminorders/2010/
AOSC10-57.pdf (quoting Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC09-54, supra note 105, at 3-5).
110 See, e.g., Del. Admin. Directive 2011-2, supra note 96 (replacing rescinded administrative
directive No. 2009-03, and charging the Community Legal Aid Society, Inc. (CLASI) with
maintaining statistics on how many workouts occur in mediations and the numbers of qualified
homeowners who participate). Florida also had third-party providers collect limited
information about the mediation session outcomes and report back to the Court. See Fla.
Admin. Order No. AOSC10-57, supra note 109, at 3-5 (citing Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC09-
54, supra note 105, at 4-5).
111 FLA. STAT. § 44.108 (2012). The Florida judiciary can only charge fees for mediation in
family law cases and county court cases involving $15,000 or less. Foreclosure mediation falls
outside of these two categories and therefore the judiciary could not collect fees for mediations
conducted in foreclosure cases nor could it receive such funds from a third-party provider.
112 For example, Washington, D.C., and Providence, Rhode Island, which both created
programs by city ordinance. See D.C. MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS, Ch. 26-C7 (effective Dec. 20,
2011).
113 States like Nevada, for example, have a part-time legislature that meets once every two
years to pass legislation. See Annual Versus Biennial Legislative Sessions, NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/annual-versus-
biennial-legislative-sessions.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
114 Interestingly, Hawaii's foreclosure dispute resolution program, reserved for non-judicial
foreclosures only, created such extensive oversight of the non-judicial foreclosures (for
example, it required lenders to provide mediators with proof and documentation of their right
to foreclose and gave borrowers a right to sue under the law if the lender did not comply with
the foreclosure mediation process) that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac took advantage of a
recent nonjudicial-to-judicial foreclosure conversion law and converted all of its foreclosures to
judicial foreclosure proceedings, thereby avoiding the mediation process entirely. See
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Conversion Frequently Asked Questions, HAW. STATE JUDICIARY,
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/self-help/foreclosure/foreclosure-conversion-faqs.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2013).
115 Only two primarily nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions established foreclosure
mediation programs through the judiciary. One, in the First Judicial District of New Mexico,
applies only to owner-occupied, residential foreclosures before the court. N.M. Admin. Order
No. 2009-00001, supra note 93. The other, New Hampshire's Judicial Branch Mediation
Program to Reduce Foreclosures was a purely voluntary program that made trained court
mediators available to all parties who wanted to participate in a mediation session, even if the
foreclosure was not before a court. The program was discontinued in October, 2011. See Office
of Mediation and Arbitration-Foreclosure Mediation Program, N.H. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/adrp/foreclosure/structure.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
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jurisdictions116have included an ADR process in state foreclosure
proceedings. Programs created by legislatures can utilize other parts of
the state apparatus1 7 to administer the program, conduct homeowner
outreach, provide housing counseling and legal assistance, and also
regulate loan servicer conduct, as will be discussed in subsequent
sections.
Thus, the branch of government that creates the foreclosure ADR
program impacts both the scope and the implementation of the
program. Certainly, in judicial foreclosure states, a judiciary may be able
to move more quickly than the state legislature to put in place a
program that will be available to all homeowners facing foreclosure and
that utilizes existing infrastructure. The judiciary already controls the
foreclosure process through the courts and need not rely upon the
political will of the legislature to overcome the resistance of business
interests or make changes or adjustments quickly. Without the support
and funding of the legislature, the judiciary may not have the resources
at hand to create and administer an effective mediation diversion
program.
B. Mediation and the Foreclosure Timeline
Although foreclosure ADR programs should provide sufficient
time and opportunity for negotiation, they must also maintain efficiency
and appreciate their impact on the regular foreclosure process. It is
crucial for state and local governments to consider the point at which
foreclosure ADR programs introduce negotiation, the duration of
negotiations, and the impact of negotiation on the conventional
foreclosure process. A single mediation session can last two hoursils or
116 Connecticut, for example, a judicial foreclosure state, was the first state to pass legislation
establishing mediation in foreclosure proceedings. The decision to use mediation as the
medium for negotiations between homeowners and loan servicers was made for practical
reasons. A pre-existing judicial mediation program for resolving landlord-tenant disputes had
been effective in the state's Housing Courts because it created an opportunity for a fair and
informed negotiation between the parties with the assistance of a neutral third party. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 47a-69 (2013). Because Connecticut's Judiciary was already familiar with the
mediation model from the Housing Courts, it was not difficult to replicate in the foreclosure
context. The program began operating in a matter of months (legislation creating the program
passed on May 5, 2008 and the first mediations occurred two months later on July 1, 2008).
117 Programs created by state statute can be administered and implemented by
administrative agencies, courts, their delegates, or a combination thereof. For example,
Maryland's foreclosure mediation program is run by the Office of Administrative Hearings, an
independent executive state agency that conducts administrative hearings. MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (West 2012). Hawaii's ADR program is run by the Department of
Commerce and Consumer Affairs in conjunction with the state judiciary's Center for
Alternative Dispute Resolution. HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-73 (2012).
118 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (West 2012).
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longer19 and some jurisdictions allow parties to negotiate for months
over multiple mediation sessions. 120 If the goal of the program is to
maximize the likelihood of a homeowner retaining the home,
negotiations should begin before the loan servicer has passed a point of
no-return on the road to foreclosure. Programs should also set a finite
period of time for negotiations during which time the foreclosure
process is suspended.
The point at which foreclosure mediations occur along the default-
to-foreclosure timeline varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Programs can bring loan servicers and borrowers to the negotiation
table before a foreclosure has been filed, while the foreclosure action is
pending, or during the redemption period after the foreclosure but
before the foreclosure sale. Some programs prohibit lenders and loan
servicers from initiating foreclosure until they have attempted to
negotiate in mediation121 while others will stay foreclosure proceedings
so that a foreclosure sale cannot be pursued as the parties concurrently
negotiate potential foreclosure alternatives.
1. When Mediation Occurs in the Foreclosure Timeline
Some jurisdictions introduce foreclosure mediation early, after the
borrower is in default and before the lender has taken steps to initiate
the foreclosure process. In Washington, a nonjudicial foreclosure state,
before a loan servicer can proceed with foreclosure, the lender must
make efforts to contact the homeowner by letter and by telephone122 to
inform him that the opportunity exists to meet and confer and he
should contact a housing counselor or attorney. 123 Homeowners in
Washington can also request mediation after receiving the loan
119 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(17) (2013).
120 For example, Cook County, Illinois, mortgage foreclosure mediation program, which
requires all parties to attend a minimum of two mandatory mediation sessions. Letter from
Dorothy Kiric Kinnaird, Presiding Judge, Chancery Div., to The President and Members of the
Cook Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs 2 (July 26, 2010), available at http://suffredin.org/pdfs/fylOq2%20
foreclosure%20update.pdf.
121 E.g., D.C. CODE § 42-815(b) (2012).
122 WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.031(1)(b) (2012).
123 Washington's mediation program is only available to homeowners who have been
referred to mediation by a housing counselor. If the homeowner fails to respond within thirty
days, then the servicer may proceed with sending the notice of default that triggers the
foreclosure process. Id. § 61.24.031(1)(d). If the homeowner does respond to the loan servicer
and requests a meeting or is referred to mediation by a housing counselor, then the borrower
and loan servicer have ninety days from the time initial contact is mailed to attempt to reach a
resolution. Id. § 61.24.031(4). Housing counselors have a duty under the law to attempt to
reach resolution within the ninety day period between the date of the lender's initial contact
and the date the notice of default is issued. Id. § 61.24.160(l)(a).
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servicer's notice of default. 124 If no mediation request is made, then the
lender proceeds with scheduling the foreclosure sale and providing the
homeowner with notice of the sale date.125 If the homeowner does
request mediation, then the recording of the foreclosure sale is
postponed until after the mediation process concludes and the mediator
issues a certificate stating the mediation has been completed.126 In a
nonjudicial foreclosure state, the timeline for a foreclosure proceeding
with an ADR component is the same as the timeline for a conventional
foreclosure because the mediations must be completed in the regular
notice period. The primary difference in Washington is that the loan
servicer has an obligation under the new law to contact the borrower
thirty days before issuing a notice of default, the event which triggers the
homeowner's eligibility for housing counseling and mediation.127
There are advantages to having the ADR option early in the
foreclosure process. First, the loan servicer may not be so invested in the
foreclosure process because it has not yet had to pay the upfront costs
involved in servicing a delinquent loan and preparing the foreclosure
(costs that, depending on the pooling and servicing agreement with the
investor trust, the servicer may only be able to recoup upon foreclosure
sale and that it will not be able to recoup if the loan instrument is
modified).128 Furthermore, the penalties and late fees that attach to a
borrower's delinquent loan likely will not have accumulated to such an
extent that the loan cannot be cured. Thus, the sooner the borrower and
loan servicer are brought together, the more likely it is that the loan
servicer's interest in being reimbursed for its servicing costs via
foreclosure will not be in conflict with the investors' interest in restoring
the loan as a performing investment and the borrower's interest in
remaining in the home.
Second, a homeowner's circumstances may be such that she cannot
produce enough income to make regular loan payments under a
modified loan structure. In this case, non-retention options that are
alternatives to foreclosure, such as a deed in lieu of foreclosure or a
short sale, can be discussed in mediation. It is unlikely that a loan
servicer would entertain these alternatives after it has already paid the
out-of-pocket expenses involved in initiating foreclosure; the earlier the
124 Id. § 61.24.030(8)(k). In these situations, the borrower has thirty days after receipt of a
notice of default to request mediation.
125 Id.
126 Id. § 61.24.163(13).
127 See Washington Foreclosure Process and Timelines, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GEN. (July 26, 2009), http://www.atg wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/Safeguarding-
Consumers/ConsumerIssuesA- Z/Foreclosures/Foreclosuretimelines.pdf.
128 See THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 16-18, 25-29. These costs include title searches, drive-
by inspections, and principal or interest payments that the loan servicer must advance to the
trustees, even if the loan is delinquent.
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homeowner can sit down with a lender for a frank and realistic
assessment of the likelihood of retaining the home, the better.
However, one potential disadvantage to having the mediation early
is that the homeowners have less time to consult an attorney or housing
counselor who can help evaluate the borrower's options, identify federal
and state assistance programs, estimate the current value of the house,
and explore other ways to boost the homeowner's income. Some
mediation programs with an early mediation option overcome this
potential disadvantage by requiring homeowners to meet with housing
counselors prior to mediation.129
Other jurisdictions introduce ADR as an option only after the
foreclosure process has begun. Illinois' Cook County, which includes
Chicago and the surrounding metropolitan area, is a judicial foreclosure
jurisdiction that created its foreclosure mediation program by judicial
rule. According to the rule, when a lender files a Complaint for
Mortgage Foreclosure, it receives a date for a special "Initial Case
Management Conference." 130 Before this Initial Case Management
Conference, scheduled for two months after the lender files,
homeowners are connected with housing counselors and volunteer
attorneys who review the homeowner's case and help the homeowners
complete, if appropriate, a Motion for Referral to Mortgage Foreclosure
Mediation.131 When the homeowner appears in court for the sixty-day
Case Management Conference, the court reviews the motion and, if it
refers the case to mediation, then the parties have twelve weeks before
they have to reappear before the court for a Post Mediation Status
hearing. 132 During this twelve-week period, a minimum of two
mediation sessions are scheduled and all parties (the mediator, the
homeowner, the homeowner's pro bono attorney, the loan servicer or
lender representative, and lender attorney) must attend. 133 If an
agreement is reached in mediation, then the agreement is presented to
the court and the foreclosure action is dismissed according to the agreed
129 For example, Maryland recently changed its laws to include a pre-filing mediation
option. Under this law, homeowners who elect to participate in early mediation must consult a
housing counselor. 2012 Md. Laws 1053 (amending MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1(d)
(2012)).
130 Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program, Gen. Admin. Order No. 2010-01, (Il. Cir. Ct.
Cook Cnty. Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.suffredin.org/pdfs/foreclosure.administrative
order.2010-Ol.pdf.
131 TIMOTHY C. EVANS & MOSHE JACOBIUS, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CNTY., IL.,
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM: REPORT AND UPDATE 14 (2011), available
at http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/ 0/Chancery%2ODivision/Forclosure%2OMediation/
Report%20to%20Commissioners%205-3-201 1.pdf.
132 Id. at 14-16.
133 Id. at 17.
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terms. If no agreement is reached, then the foreclosure proceeds along
the normal litigation track. 134
Jurisdictions that have a lengthy right of redemption period also
give borrowers the right to request mediation with their lender even
after the foreclosure has been finalized. In Vermont, for example, a
lender is not permitted to sell a foreclosed residential property
immediately after foreclosing and taking legal title to the property.
Rather, the lender must hold off selling the property for a six-month
redemption period, during which time the homeowner can recover the
property by paying the full amount owed on the loan.135 Homeowners in
Vermont may request mediation with the loan servicer during this six
month period;136 however, the program rules state explicitly that a court
has the right to shorten the redemption period or deny the mediation
request if it believes the request is being made as a delaying tactic.137
The time it takes for a foreclosure to run from default notice to sale
is important for lenders and borrowers. For homeowners, the time
between default notification and sale is important because the longer the
delay, the more interest, fees, and penalties will accrue, making it
difficult to achieve a sustainable modification. If foreclosure is
unavoidable, the additional costs will ultimately be deducted from the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale or attached personally to the foreclosed
homeowner as deficiency judgments. For lenders, the picture is more
complicated. A lender foreclosing on a house that is likely to sell for the
full value of the loan has an incentive to move the foreclosure process
along quickly. A lender foreclosing on a house that is overleveraged or
unlikely to sell may have an incentive to delay the foreclosure process
and put off responsibility for maintaining and securing a vacant home
for as long as possible.138
Including foreclosure mediation in the foreclosure process does
not negatively impact one party or another by extending the overall
foreclosure timeline by any considerable amount of time.139 Mediations
134 Id.
135 2012 Vt. Acts & Resolves, Act No. 102.
136 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4632(b) (2012) ("[All mediation shall be completed prior to
the expiration of the redemption period. The redemption period shall not be stayed on account
of pending mediation.").
137 Id. § 4632(a).
138 The Federal Housing Finance Agency's "REO to Rental" program attempts to move real
estate owned properties held by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing
Administration to qualified, private investors. See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA
Announces Interested Investors May Pre-Qualify for REO Initiative (Feb. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23196/REO2112F.pdf.
139 The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), citing RealtyTrac, reports that foreclosures
nationwide took an average of 336 days to complete, with states like New York, New Jersey, and
Florida taking over two years. WALSH, supra note 38, at 38. NCLC points out in its white paper
Rebuilding America that the unprecedented foreclosure delays in 2010 and 2011 had little, if
anything, to do with the foreclosure conference and mediation programs. Id.
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occurring before or concurrently with foreclosure filing will more likely
lead to modification since the smaller the delinquency period the greater
the chance of curing the loan. There appears to be no disadvantage to
permitting foreclosure mediation during the redemption period.
However, by the time the redemption period begins, a home retention
agreement is unlikely to occur because the loan servicer has expended
resources to foreclose- resources that can only be recouped from the
investor trust through foreclosure.
2. Does Mediation Stay or Prevent Foreclosure?
Jurisdictions must also determine what impact, if any, an ADR
process will have on the conventional foreclosure proceeding. Some
jurisdictions prevent loan servicers from initiating foreclosure until they
have participated in mediation and the mediation process has
concluded. 140 Others jurisdictions place a stay on the foreclosure process
while the parties are in mediation by preventing servicers from
recording the foreclosure sale until the parties complete mediation.14, A
third group of jurisdictions is silent as to whether a loan servicer may
pursue foreclosure while negotiating foreclosure alternatives.142 If the
purpose of mediation is for parties to commit to a serious discussion
about alternatives, it is inconsistent to allow a loan servicer
simultaneously to pursue foreclosure and negotiate an alternative. Loan
servicers pursuing foreclosure appear disingenuous and erode borrower
confidence that the loan servicer is participating in mediation in good
faith. 143
A related question is what happens to the foreclosure timeline if a
contingent or temporary modification agreement is reached during a
foreclosure mediation or settlement. A contingent agreement might be
one in which the loan servicer agrees to modify the homeowner's loan if
140 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735(5)(b) (2012). The Foreclosure Avoidance Mediation
Program in Oregon, a nonjudicial foreclosure state, prohibits lenders from initiating
foreclosure until they have participated in the program and can show either that the borrower
is ineligible for any foreclosure alternatives or "is not in compliance with the terms of a
foreclosure avoidance measure." Id.
141 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.031(16)(a) (2012) (prohibiting a lender from
recording a notice of foreclosure sale until the lender receives a certificate from the mediator
stating that mediation has been successfully completed).
142 See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CTS., NEW JERSEY FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2 (2012),
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/foreclosure/11290 foreclosuremed-info.pdf.
For a sample form of foreclosure mediation instructions for homeowners seeking a stay of a
sheriff's sale and mediation, see STAY OF SHERIFF'S SALE NOTICE OF MOTION INSTRUCTIONS,
CATALOG NO. 11277 (2013), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/forms.htm#foremed.
143 See generally ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WALK THE TALK: BEST PRACTICES
ON THE ROAD TO AUTOMATIC FORECLOSURE MEDIATION (2010), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/11/pdf/walk-the-talk.pdf.
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the homeowner resubmits a completed loan modification application or
if the homeowner successfully completes a three-month trial
modification period. Contingent agreements prove problematic because
parties exit the mediation process without final resolution and may not
be able to conclude negotiations without the structure of a mediation
program. Jurisdictions handle the challenge of contingent or temporary
agreements differently. In Connecticut, some judges hold the case in
mediation until the contingency is met and a final loan modification is
executed. 144 This means a case may be stalled and unresolved for weeks
or sometimes months. In Maryland, administrative law judges have the
authority as mediators to continue the mediation for a second session so
that the parties have an opportunity to return to the negotiating table
and finalize an agreement; however, that second session has to occur
within the sixty day statutory time period for mediation. 145 Beyond that
time, the mediation program cannot provide oversight for any
continuing negotiations. Nevada's foreclosure mediation program,
which also restricts the entire mediation process to a statutory
timeframe, resolves this problem by requiring all contingent or
temporary agreements to include an expiration date certain. 146
Therefore, if a loan servicer fails to grant the permanent modification
after the borrower successfully completes the trial period or a
homeowner fails to provide necessary documentation by the agreed
upon date, the other party has a cause to petition for judicial review.147
Parties should be given adequate time and opportunity to engage
seriously in discussions about alternatives to foreclosure and to come to
a resolution. Prohibiting loan servicers from pursuing foreclosure while
they are in negotiations with borrowers is one way to ensure that loan
servicers do not turn automatically to foreclosure without first taking
the time to evaluate other loss mitigation or non-retention options with
the borrower. However, once parties enter mediation, the stay on
foreclosure should not be indefinite. Allowing parties to meet as often as
necessary within a strict timeframe discourages both parties from using
the mediation process as a delay tactic. Furthermore, restricting
contingent or temporary agreements promotes a final settlement of the
delinquent loan. Contingent agreements should have expiration dates,
or a date certain by which the parties shall have complied with their
144 Public Hearing on H.B. 5410 Before the Banks Comm., 2010 Leg., 2010 Reg. Sess. (Conn.
2010) (statement of Rep. Ryan Barry on the equitable powers of judges presiding over
foreclosure cases).
145 Foreclosure Mediation, MD. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, http://www.oah.state.md.us/
foreclosuremediation.asp (last visited May 19, 2013).
146 NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 16(1).
147 The foreclosure settlement program in Cook County, Illinois, requires agreements for a
trial modification to contain language that, upon successful payment, the modification
automatically becomes permanent. EVANS & JACOBIUS, supra note 131, at 22-23.
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obligations, and contingent agreements should include language making
them permanent upon satisfaction of the contingency.
C. Homeowner Enrollment: Automatic, Opt-In, and Triage
There are three different models for enrolling homeowners in
foreclosure ADR programs. Some jurisdictions automatically send all
parties to a foreclosure action to a mediation or settlement program,
some require the borrower to affirmatively request to participate in a
program, and yet others use housing counselors as gatekeepers to screen
borrowers and refer those who are eligible to the program. There are
advantages and challenges to consider in each approach. Nevertheless,
no matter the trigger for homeowner enrollment, programs that make
concerted efforts to reach borrowers and educate them about the
foreclosure process and mediation will likely have greater impact.
Programs with automatic enrollment send parties to a foreclosure
proceeding directly to mediation. Automatic enrollment has the effect of
boosting homeowner participation. New York's statewide program
automatically sends homeowners with mortgages and lenders to an
early, mandatory settlement conference presided over by judges, hearing
officers, or a court attorney "referee."148 Once a foreclosure action is
filed in the court, the court sends the homeowner a court summons with
the date, time, and place of the settlement conference as well as the date,
time, and place of a required meeting with a court housing counselor.149
In contrast, opt-in programs require that the borrower first request
to participate in a foreclosure mediation or settlement conference.
However, borrower participation in an opt-in program hinges upon
whether the borrower has been properly notified about the possibility of
participating in the first place. Many jurisdictions publicize foreclosure
mediation to borrowers by requiring loan servicers to include
information about mediation in official notices sent to borrowers about
148 See ANN PFAU, STATE OF N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2010 REPORT OF THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS 3 (2010), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
publications/pdfs/foreclosurereportnov20lO.pdf.
149 For a sample notice from the court, see id. app. 2. Providence, Rhode Island, which uses a
nonjudicial foreclosure procedure, also requires all parties to a residential mortgage foreclosure
to attend, or at least attempt to attend, mandatory conciliation conferences with approved
housing counselors before a foreclosure deed can be recorded. PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 13-216 (2011). The original ordinance, Providence, R.I., Ordinance No. 340, ch.
2009-41, § 1 (July 27, 2009), denied lenders the ability to record a foreclosure deed in the land
evidence records until they could present a certificate showing they had attended the
conciliation conference and negotiated in good faith, id. This section of the ordinance was
struck down by the Rhode Island Superior Court in Deutsche Bank National Trust v. City of
Providence, P.C. No. 10-1240, 2010 R.I. Super. LEXIS 81 (R.I. Super. Ct., May 17, 2010), and a
new ordinance with a revised penalty was issued, Providence, R.I., Ordinance No. 18, ch. 2010-
2, § 1 (Jan. 21, 2010).
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the delinquent loan and impending foreclosure proceedings.150 Other
jurisdictions do not rely solely upon the lenders' communications to get
the word out to borrowers but also have a third party, either a
government agency or a housing counselor, contact homeowners about
participating in mediation.151
Yet a third category of programs uses court administrators or
designated housing counselors to screen homeowners for program
eligibility. Ohio's model mediation program suggests that the local
court's mediation department screen all mediation requests for
borrower eligibility before referring the case to foreclosure mediation.152
Although the model suggests criteria for borrower eligibility, each local
court can determine its own eligibility standards depending on its
available resources. 153 Another screening approach uses housing
counselors to triage ineligible borrowers and refer eligible borrowers to
mediation. Similarly, Washington's statewide program requires loan
servicers to send a Notice of Pre-foreclosure Options informing
delinquent borrowers of the availability of housing counselors and also
that, if they do not contact a housing counselor or attorney, then they
may lose the opportunity to participate in mediation. 154 Once a
homeowner contacts a housing counselor, the counselor must review
the homeowner's circumstances and assess eligibility for mediation.155 If
150 In Vermont, for example, servicers must "state the importance of participating in
mediation even if the homeowner is currently communicating" with the lender or loan servicer
in the notice of the foreclosure action. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4632(c)-(d) (2012).
151 For example, Hawaii's nonjudicial foreclosure dispute resolution program requires loan
servicers to include in their foreclosure notices an explanation that the lender has a duty under
the law "to attempt to avoid foreclosure or to mitigate damages where foreclosure is
unavoidable," and that the lender is required, upon election by the homeowner, to participate
in the foreclosure dispute resolution program. HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-75(a) (2012). The
servicer must also send a copy of the foreclosure notice to the State's Department of Commerce
and Consumer Affairs, which then independently mails information regarding the availability
of the dispute resolution program to the borrower along with the forms to elect or waive
participation in the program. Id. §§ 667-76(a), 667-77.
152 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM MODEL 18 (2008),
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure-mortgage/foreclosure med-prog-by-
state/ohio-prgm-model.pdf.
153 The model suggests that, at a minimum, homeowner eligibility for foreclosure mediation
should depend on whether the borrower filed an answer or alternative pleading with the court,
sent a request for mediation to the program administrator, and indicated that the homeowner
is currently residing, and would like to remain, in the property subject to foreclosure. Id.
154 WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.031(1)(c) (2012).
155 Id. § 61.24.160(3). Eligibility criteria include the following: the property is currently
owner-occupied; the lender is not exempt under the Foreclosure Fairness Act; the homeowner
has received notice either of the pre-foreclosure options or of default; and if the homeowner is
in bankruptcy, then bankruptcy has been stayed or the homeowner has consented to negotiate a
modification of the mortgage. STATE OF WASH. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FORECLOSURE FAIRNESS
PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA & GUIDANCE FOR REFERRALS TO MEDIATION (2012), available
at http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/FFP-REFERRAL-ELIGIBILTY-GUIDANCE-Dec
2012-Update.pdf. Compare these to Delaware's initial program eligibility criteria, which require
homeowners to show they could reasonably sustain monthly mortgage payments (including
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a housing counselor concludes that a homeowner is eligible for
mediation, the housing counselor sends a notice to the borrower and
Washington's Department of Commerce stating that mediation is
appropriate.156 From there, the Department selects a mediator and
notifies the parties. 157
There are advantages and challenges in all three options. Programs
that automatically send parties to foreclosure mediation have a far
higher percentage of participating borrowers.158 That means many more
homeowners are being evaluated for loan modifications or non-
retention alternatives to foreclosure. Even if parties automatically sent
to mediation do not come to an agreement in mediation, at least the
homeowner now has the contact information for a person who works
for the loan servicer and has the authority to settle the case. However,
programs with such a high volume of cases have the potential to be
more costly because they require more administrative oversight and
may not be able to filter out those cases that are not appropriate for
mediation, wasting resources as a consequence. Conversely, opt-in
programs that require borrowers to affirmatively request mediation
have many fewer cases, thereby requiring less administrative oversight,
but they may not be reaching those homeowners who are not already
proactively engaged in reaching out to their loan servicer. If lack of
initiative on the part of homeowner and lack of communication on the
part of the loan servicer is one of the problems foreclosure mediation
seeks to resolve, then it does not make sense for participation in
foreclosure mediation to require the same initiative and communication
that has been lacking from the start.
The third alternative, which uses housing counselors as gatekeepers
for mediation, appears to be the best way to maximize the advantages
and minimize the challenges of the other two approaches. Attaching
housing counseling as a precursor to mediation ultimately makes
negotiations more efficient and equitable because the homeowners head
into mediation informed about their options and equipped with
knowledge that can help level the playing field at the negotiation table.
An educated borrower may not waste time seeking outcomes that are
taxes, principal, interest, insurance, homeowner association dues, and other fees typically
placed in escrow) that were thirty-eight percent, or less than the homeowner's gross (pretax)
monthly income. Del. Admin. Directive No. 2011-2, supra note 96, at 4.
156 WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(2) (2012).
157 Id. § 61.24.163(3)(b).
158 The Center for American Progress reports that programs with automatic mediation have
close to seventy-five percent of homeowners facing foreclosure participate, while opt-in
programs rarely have more than twenty percent of homeowners facing foreclosure
participating. ALON COHEN & ANDREW JAKABOVICS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Now WE'RE
TALKING: A LOOK AT CURRENT STATE-BASED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS AND How
TO BRING THEM TO SCALE 7 (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/foreclosure mediation.pdf.
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unrealistic or economically unfeasible. Loan servicers also stand to
benefit when borrowers work with housing counselors before entering
negotiation because it is more likely that the borrower will properly
complete and submit completed loan modification applications that the
loan servicer can review prior to the mediation and allow for an actual
negotiation. Lenders also benefit if a profitable loss-mitigation option is
put in place and the mortgage continues to provide a profitable return
on their investment as a result of informed negotiations. Finally, courts
in judicial foreclosure states benefit from using housing counselors
instead of court administrators to screen cases, saving the court from
additional administrative burdens. 159
No matter how homeowners are enrolled in a foreclosure ADR
program, reaching homeowners and informing them in terms they can
understand about opportunities for a facilitated negotiation with their
loan's servicer or lender is crucial to a program's success. Many
homeowners do not open and read through the stacks of materials sent
by lenders and many may be suspicious about loan servicers' overtures
to mediate.160 Therefore, communications from neutral third parties,
such as the courts or another administrative agency, in addition to the
notices borrowers receive from lenders, may be an effective way to
engender trust in borrowers. Some of the more successful mediation
and settlement programs have engaged in extensive public outreach
campaigns to reach borrowers.161 In Philadelphia, for example, an
outreach team of volunteers from grass roots organizations went door to
door to homeowners who had received notices of foreclosure but had
not yet called the program hotline. Equipped with cellular mobile
phones, the volunteers would explain the program in person to the
homeowners and then had the homeowner call the hotline while the
volunteer waited at the front door.162 As a result, ninety percent of
homeowners facing foreclosure participated in the city's settlement
program. 163
159 See COHEN, supra note 143, at 16.
160 Florida's program was also poorly publicized, and borrowers were unsure of its
legitimacy. See Palmer Letter, supra note 108, at 4.
161 Judges and court staff in Queens County, New York, "participated in evening and
weekend programs to inform the public about court procedures under the legislation as well as
the availability of housing counseling and legal services." See PFAU, supra note 148, at 8. The
Ohio Department of Commerce launched "Save the Dream" as a public awareness campaign
with advertisements on radio and television, a user-friendly website, and a free telephone
hotline with information and access to an approved housing counselor. See, e.g., Foreclosure
Mediation, CUYAHOGA CNTY. COMMON PLEAS COURT, http://cp.cuyahogacounty.us/intemet/
ForeclosureMediation.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
162 See JAKABOVICS &COHEN, supra note 9, at 19; THE REINVESTMENT FUND, PHILADELPHIA
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM: INITIAL REPORT OF FINDINGS 3
(2011), available at http://www.trfund.com/resource/downloads/policypubs/Foreclosure-
DiversionInitialReport.pdf.
163 COHEN, supra note 143, at 20.
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D. Third-Party Facilitator Qualifications, Responsibilities,
and Confidentiality
State and local governments seeking to effectively and efficiently
resolve communication barriers, educate borrowers, and provide
oversight of loan servicers' conduct should have a third-party facilitator
involved in the negotiations. Indeed, almost all existing foreclosure
ADR programs include a third-party facilitator. 164 Sometimes this
person is called a "mediator" and sometimes the person is given a
different label, such as, conciliation conference coordinator165 or a
neutral dispute resolution specialist.166 Third-party facilitators can play
a central role in foreclosure negotiations and, therefore, programs that
utilize facilitators should ensure those individuals are qualified,
appropriately trained, and clear on their role and responsibilities in the
process.167 One responsibility that many programs give their facilitators
is to monitor parties' behavior and report on the outcomes of mediation
sessions, information that is invaluable in determining whether a
program is fulfilling its purpose. Programs need to make sure that
requiring facilitators to report does not conflict with state laws
regarding confidentiality of mediation or settlement communications.
164 A few programs do not have a third party facilitator. New York automatically requires all
borrowers and lenders that are parties to a residential foreclosure action to attend mandatory
settlement conferences. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408. Indiana gives borrowers who are the owner-
occupiers of a residential property in foreclosure, and who have not had a prior loan
modification, the option of requesting a settlement conference with the lender. See IND. CODE
§ 32-30-10.5-8 (2012). Philadelphia's program has borrowers and lenders meet in court to
negotiate alternatives to foreclosure, and only when no agreement can be reached is a judge pro
tern called in to preside over the case in a closed-door session. See Residential Mortgage
Foreclosure Diversion Pilot Program, Joint Gen. Court Regulation No. 2008-01 (Pa. Ct. of C.P.,
Phila. Cnty., 1st Dist. 2008) [hereinafter Phila. Court Regulation No. 2008-01], available at
http://d.phila.gov/pdf/regs/2008/cpjgcr-2008-Ol.pdf. California and Massachusetts have no
formal program but require lenders to make contact with borrowers and assess foreclosure
alternatives before proceeding with a foreclosure sale. See CAL. CIV. CODE §2923.5 (West 2012);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 35A(c) (2012). Both laws were challenged successfully in federal
court and found to be preempted by the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933. Rodriguez v. J.P.
Morgan Chase, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Sovereign Bank v. Sturgis, 863 F. Supp.
2d 75 (D. Mass. 2012).
165 See PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 13-213 (2012).
166 HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-1 (2012).
167 Connecticut was the first state to use mediators to facilitate foreclosure settlement
negotiations. There had been a judicial mediation program in Connecticut's Housing Courts
since 1978 that proved effective in resolving landlord-tenant disputes because it created the
opportunity for a fair and informed negotiation between the parties with the assistance of a
neutral third party. These housing specialists, later called mediators, were required to have
particular knowledge of applicable laws and could also advise parties regarding availability of
financial assistance. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-69(b) (2012). When the foreclosure crisis hit
Connecticut, the judiciary lifted the pre-existing Housing Court mediator model and applied it
to foreclosure cases. See id. § 47a-69(c) (allowing mediators to recommend settlements).
1930
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1. Facilitator Qualifications and Training
Some programs require facilitators to be attorneys168or judges,
retired judges, or administrative law judges with mediation training.69
A number of programs additionally require that attorneys also have
mediation training and/or have subject matter expertise in foreclosure
law.170 Some facilitators have to be experienced mediators on the staff of
a court's mediation office, serve on a roster of court-approved
mediators,171 or be independent mediators.172 Only one program, the
foreclosure conciliation program in Providence, Rhode Island, uses
housing counselors as facilitators. Some programs also want their
facilitators to have knowledge of local, community-based resources and
mortgage assistance programs 173 or previous work experience in
foreclosures, credit, and collections work. 174 Maine and Vermont
further require their foreclosure mediators to know how to utilize
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) net present value
worksheets for determining the viability of a HAMP loan
modification.175
Almost all programs require training, but the training ranges in
content and duration.176 Ohio requires those mediators with prior
mediation training to take a four-and-a-half hour training on
168 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 463 1(c) (2012). Vermont's foreclosure mediation program,
which exists primarily as a means to assure that lenders are evaluating homeowners for HAMP
eligibility, requires mediators to be attorneys licensed in the state who have completed
continuing legal education courses approved by the Vermont Bar Association.
169 For example, the administrative law judges who preside over foreclosure mediations in
Maryland and Maine are trained mediators. MAINE REV. STAT. tit. 4, §§ 104, 157-B (2012); id.
tit. 14, § 6321-A(7); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1(k)(2) (West 2012).
170 See, e.g., Automatic Residential Foreclosure Mediation Program § 4, at 5, Administrative
Directive No. 2012-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Del. Admin. Directive No.
2012-2], available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Superior/pdf/AdministrativeDirective_2012_
2.pdf; Phila. Court Regulation No. 2008-01, supra note 164, § 6(a), at 3.
171 See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC10-57, supra note 110, at 2-3.
172 Nevada defines "experienced mediator" as someone who has "participated in a mediation
training program consisting of at least 40 hours of classroom and role playing and has
conducted 10 mediations as a co-mediator or sole mediator." Order on Foreclosure Mediation
Rules, Rule 3 (Nev. Sup. Ct. June 30, 2009) (amending Rule 3.4(a)(2)), available at
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/images/foreclosure/adkt435_amendedrules.pdf.
173 See, e.g., MAINE REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 6321-A(7)(A)(2), (7)(A)(3) (2011).
174 See Foreclosure Diversion Program Information for Potential Mediators, STATE OF ME.
JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.me.us/maine-courts/fdp/mediators.html (last
visited Jan. 9, 2013).
175 See MAINE REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 6321-A(3), (7)(A)(4), (13) (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 4634(b)(4) (2012).
176 For example, Florida's statewide managed mediation program provided an extensive
curriculum for training foreclosure mediators. The curriculum and training standards were
attached as an exhibit to the Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order establishing the
statewide managed mediation program. See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC09-54, supra note
105, exhibit A, at A-58 to A-66 (Fla. 2009).
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foreclosure 'mediation 177 whereas Oregon's Foreclosure Avoidance
Mediation Program training consists of three, full eight-hour days.178
Most training includes basic mediation skills as well as information on
mortgages, deeds of trust, promissory notes, and how to work through
loan modifications and non-retention alternatives.179 Some jurisdictions
offer follow-up trainings to keep facilitators up-to-date on
developments in the law, mortgage assistance programs, and program
policies. 180
Because foreclosure negotiations can be both highly technical and
highly emotional, and there is often a stark contrast in sophistication
and experience between the parties, it is crucial that third-party
facilitators have appropriate skills and training to run a fair process.
Homeowners generally have only one chance to participate in a
foreclosure settlement program and have little prior experience with
negotiating eligibility for loan modifications or non-retention plans.
Loan servicers, on the other hand, are represented in these programs by
the same attorneys who negotiate on their behalf in dozens, if not
hundreds, of foreclosure cases.
2. Facilitator Role and Responsibilities
Programs should also clarify the roles and responsibilities of the
third-party facilitator to ensure that there is as much uniformity as
177 See SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION TRAININGS AND
ROUNDTABLES (2009), http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/JCS/disputeResolution/foreclosure/
Training.pdf. Individuals eligible for the training must have previously completed at least
twelve hours of mediation training. Nevertheless, for those mediators new to foreclosure, the
foreclosure mediation training addresses quite a range of issues: the history and scope of the
foreclosure crisis; relevant terminology; players and the dynamics of the foreclosure servicing
industry; limitations, advantages and disadvantages for the parties in foreclosure cases and the
information required from the parties to come to an agreement under a range of settlement
options; analysis of the possibilities and limitations of mediation between pro se homeowners
and lenders in foreclosure cases; relevant statutes and rules; the local court foreclosure
mediation program processes and procedures; and, if applicable, the Supreme Court
Foreclosure Mediation Program Model. Id.
178 The training includes eight hours of foreclosure law basics, eight hours of foreclosure law
for mediators, and eight hours about foreclosure avoidance mediation in practice. Order to
Adopt OJD Court-Connected Mediator Qualifications Rules 10, Chief Justice Order No. 05-028
(Or. Sup. Ct. July 28, 2005), available at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/web/OJDPublications.nsf/
Files/05cER001sh.pdf/$File/05cER001sh.pdf.
179 See, e.g., Order on Foreclosure Mediation Rules, supra note 172, Rule 3 (amending Rule
3.4(b)). In New Jersey, the foreclosure mediators are volunteers with eighteen hours of
mediation training who are required to complete a free, one-day training on working out
foreclosure alternatives.
180 See, e.g., HAW. bEP'T OF COMMERCE & CONSUMER AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
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possible across mediations. At base, programs charge the facilitator with
overseeing the negotiation process between the borrower and the lender
and helping them work toward a mutually acceptable resolution. The
facilitator can be present throughout the process or can be called in by
the parties when needed.18, The way in which the facilitator runs the
process is sometimes specified. For example, Ohio's foreclosure
mediators use a facilitative style182 of mediation to guide the parties
through a "party self-determination" process in which the mediators
provide resource information but do not give advice or advocate for
either party.18 3 The conciliation coordinators in the City of Providence,
on the other hand, function impartially but are responsible for leading
the parties through an exploration of foreclosure work-out or
modification options.184
Some programs provide explicit instructions to mediators on what
topics should be discussed in mediation. In Maine, for example,
Foreclosure Diversion Program mediators are expected to lead the
homeowner and lender through all issues of foreclosure including: 1)
proof of ownership of the note and any assignments of the note, 2)
calculation of the sums due on the note for principal, interest, and any
costs or fees, 3) reinstatement of the mortgage, 4) modification of the
loan, and 5) restructuring of the mortgage debt.185 In the alternative,
Washington's foreclosure mediators help the parties address foreclosure
alternatives by having the parties consider the borrower's current and
anticipated financial circumstances, compare the anticipated net
recovery following foreclosure versus the value of payments under a
181 In Delaware, a mediator can step out of the mediation if there are multiple mediation
sessions occurring simultaneously and the mediator determines that his or her presence is not
required for the entire mediation session. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §5062C(i)(1) (2012); see also
Phila. Court Regulation No. 2008-01, supra note 164, at 3.
182 There are many mediation "styles" (for example, evaluative, transformative, facilitative,
to name some of the major ones). A mediator's style refers primarily to how the mediator
orients him or herself toward the parties' problem-solving. See Leonard L. Riskin,
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1 (2003); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 111, 111-14 (1994).
183 JACQUELINE C. HAGEROTT, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION: AN OVERVIEW (2011),
available at http://mvfairhousing.com/cle/resources/04%2OForeclosure%2OMediation%2OAn
%200verview%20(Jacqueline%2OHagerott%20presentation).PDF. Nevada also explains that the
mediator's role is not that of a judge or a lawyer because they neither decide how to resolve the
case nor give legal advice. See Mediator Documents, STATE OF NEV. FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION PROGRAM, http://foreclosure.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/documents-and-forms/
mediator-documents (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
184 CITY OF PROVIDENCE, FORECLOSURE CONCILIATION REQUIREMENT, DUTIES OF
PARTICIPANTS, APPLYING THE ORDINANCE, MODEL CERTIFICATIONS (2009),
http://www.providenceri.com/efile/230.
185 Foreclosure Diversion Program Information for Potential Mediators, STATE OF ME.
JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.me.us/maine-courts/fdp/mediators.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2013).
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modified mortgage loan, and run calculations under all federal
mortgage relief programs.1 8 6 If programs expect mediators to facilitate
this kind of discussion, then the mediators must have special training
and expertise.
In addition to running the foreclosure settlement process, some
programs require facilitators to prepare mediation reports 187 and
perform administrative tasks. These tasks can include scheduling the
mediation session with the parties, 188 collecting documents, and
referring the borrower to housing counseling.189 Mediation reporting
requirements vary widely. Some states require a report from the third-
party facilitator. Depending on the jurisdiction, this report is sent
directly to the court or dispute resolution program administrator and
can be more or less detailed.190 In Vermont, for example, mediators
report the results of each mediation session (including all HAMP-
related net present value calculations and other foreclosure avoidance
calculations performed for the mediation)191 as well as whether a full or
partial settlement was reached. Mediators must also provide a copy of
that agreement. 192 Some programs also have mediators issue a
mediation certification that the lender must either present to the Court
in order to proceed with the judicial foreclosure proceeding193 or file
with land records in a nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdiction.194Other
186 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.163(9) (West 2012); WASH. STATE
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPECTATIONS OF A FORECLOSURE MEDIATOR (2012),
http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/FFP-Expectation-of-a-Foreclosure-Mediator.pdf
Running these calculations is required before the mediator can issue the mediation certification
the lender needs to proceed with foreclosure.
187 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31n (2012) (requiring the mediator to determine
whether parties to a foreclosure proceeding will benefit from further mediation and, if so, file a
report with the court describing the proceedings, any issues resolved, and any issues
unresolved).
188 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(7)(b) (2012).
189 Cayuhoga County, Ohio has mediators refer homeowners to housing counseling prior to
mediation. The housing counselor attempts to work out a foreclosure alternative between the
lender and borrower and reports back to the mediator. The mediator can help the parties
finalize any agreements reached. If a borrower fails to go to housing counseling, then the
borrower's right to mediation ends and the case proceeds in court. Foreclosure Action Coalition:
Cuyahoga County "Foreclosure Time Out" Plan, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure-mortgage/foreclosure-med-prog-bystate/ohio-
alt proposal.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
190 In Maine, for example, a mediator must complete a report for each mediation. The report
must indicate that the parties completed the Net Present Value Worksheet in the FDIC Loan
Modification Program Guide. If the mediation did not result in the settlement or dismissal of
the action, the report must include the outcomes of the Net Present Value Worksheet. As part
of the report, the mediator may notify the court if, in the mediator's opinion, either party failed
to negotiate in good faith. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(13) (2010).
191 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4634(b)(4) (2012).
192 Id. § 4634(b)(5).
193 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5062C(i)(9) (2012).
194 D.C. CODE § 42-815(d) (2012).
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programs created standard report forms for mediators to complete after
a mediation session. These forms identify whether an agreement was
reached, whether and under what terms the homeowner is retaining or
relinquishing the property, and the specifics of any loan modification or
agreement regarding the deficiency. 195
Another responsibility sometimes placed on the mediator is to
monitor the parties and assess whether they have negotiated in good
faith and, if not, to suggest what sanctions to impose. This assessment of
good faith occurs primarily in nonjudicial foreclosure states where there
is no direct court supervision of foreclosure proceedings,196 although
some judicial foreclosure states also require mediators to report whether
the parties mediated in good faith. 197 As is discussed in greater detail
below, using the mediator to report on party behavior can be an
effective way for a program to provide oversight but the reporting
should involve objective criteria, with checklist forms provided by the
program, not a subjective evaluation by the mediator of the parties'
good faith participation.
There are clear benefits to having a third-party facilitator present in
foreclosure mediations and settlement conferences. Simply bringing the
parties together and relying on them to reach resolution on their own is
unlikely to work, given the problematic nature of the relationship
between loan servicers and homeowners.198 Mediators can help adjust
for any imbalance of power between the lender representative and the
homeowner. Not all homeowners have the assistance of legal counsel
and not all homeowners going to mediation have met with a housing
counselor. 199 The mediator can help create a structure to the
195 See, e.g., Mediator Documents, STATE OF NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM,
supra note 183; Legal Practice Forms, N.J. COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/forms.htm
#foreclosure (last visited May 20, 2013); Foreclosure Mediation Program Model Documents,
Resources and Training, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/JCS/dispute
Resolution/foreclosure/documents.asp (last updated Oct. 2009); Foreclosure Fairness Program,
WASH. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, http://www.commerce.wa.gov/site/1367/default.aspx (last visited
May 20, 2013).
196 Nevada mandates foreclosure mediators to prepare and submit to the program a
recommendation for sanctions on a lender or its representative who fails to attend the
mediation, participate in good faith, or exchange required documents. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 107.086(5) (2011). If the borrower does not appear for the mediation session, then the lender
receives a certificate and can proceed with the foreclosure process. Id. § 107.086(6).
197 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5062C(e)(2), (f) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-
A(12) (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4634(b)(A)(2) (West 2012). Not all programs define
good faith merely as attendance in mediation, presuming mediators will know a lack of good
faith in mediation when they see it. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
198 Some states, like Washington, started out with a "meet and confer" program similar to
California's but found that it did not do enough to change loan servicer behavior. Washington
State's Foreclosure Fairness Act: A Second Try at a Fair, Clearly Defined and Enforceable Process
for Homeowners Facing Foreclosure, MY VIEW (Wash. State Hous. Fin. Comm'n), June 2011, at
2, available at http://www.wshfc.org/newsletter/2011.06.print.pdf.
199 See infra Part III.E.
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negotiations so that all alternatives to foreclosure are systematically
explored. A properly trained mediator can help the parties work
through the borrower's financial documents and apply the loan
servicer's loan modification evaluation methods. Additionally, programs
that give mediators the power to report on parties' behavior send the
clear message to lenders that these mediation sessions are to be taken
seriously. An ADR program not just another procedural hoop through
which the lender must pass but is designed to make parties assess
whether foreclosure really is the best way to proceed.
3. Confidentiality
The requirement that third-party facilitators provide a detailed
report on the mediation session or settlement conference is
controversial because of confidentiality. Mediation is a confidential
process; information shared during a foreclosure mediation that is not
otherwise discoverable cannot be used in other court proceedings.200
Many programs explicitly state that discussion during foreclosure
mediation is confidential20' or that mediators are protected from having
200 While there are many visions of what a process called "mediation" looks like, all consider
confidentiality to be one of mediation's core principles. See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8
(2003), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mediation/uma final_03.pdf;
AM. BAR ASS'N, PREPARING FOR MEDIATION 2 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/images/disputejresolution/MediationGuide.general.pdf; Lela P. Love &
Joseph B. Stulberg, Understanding Dispute Resolution Processes, in CONDUCTING THE
MEDIATOR SKILL-BUILDING TRAINING PROGRAM-INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL (rev. ed. 1997),
reprinted in CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER,
MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND ETHICS 14-16 (2006). Most states have laws with
confidentiality provisions that protect mediation communications. A few state foreclosure
mediation statutes, like Washington's, have confidentiality clauses in them. See WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 61.24.169(4) (2012).
201 The foreclosure mediation programs in Connecticut, Oregon, Tuscarawas County, Ohio,
and Wisconsin's Sheboygan County all state that mediation sessions are confidential. See OR.
ADMIN. R. § 137-110-0410(1)(b)(ix) (2013); COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, TUSCARAWAS CNTY.,
OHIO, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM (2008), available at http://www.co.tuscarawas.
oh.us/treasurer/Resources/Final%20Foreclosure%2OBrochurel.pdf; Foreclosure Mediation
Program: Homeowner Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
http://www.jud.ct.gov/foreclosure/homeowner-qs.htm#10 (last visited May 20, 2013);
Sheboygan County Foreclosure Mediation Program FAQ, SHEBOYGAN CNTY., WISC.,
http://www.sheboygancounty.com/government/departments-a-e/clerk-of-circuit-courts/
foreclosure-mediation-program-faq (last visited May 20, 2013). Nevada's foreclosure mediation
program rules state:
All documents and discussions presented during the mediation shall be deemed
confidential and inadmissible in any subsequent actions or proceedings, except in an
action for judicial review... In that case, non-privileged evidence submitted for
mediation is discoverable, with the exception of confidential information such as
social security numbers, account numbers, and tax ID numbers pursuant to the
redaction statute.
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to testify in court,202 although some make no mention of confidentiality
at all. When confidentiality is mentioned, it is usually in reference to the
documents exchanged in mediation and any personal financial
information discussed in mediation.203 For states that have already
adopted the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA), confidentiality may
automatically apply to these sessions or there may be other state law
regulating the confidentiality of mediation sessions.204
On the one hand, it is important for jurisdictions to be able to
evaluate whether mediation sessions are in fact accomplishing what they
promise. Because mediations and settlement conferences are private and
there is no public record of the discussion, it is difficult to know if the
parties and the facilitator are systematically assessing each variation on a
loan modification and each non-retention alternative. Without a
mediator's report, the only information available to a program
administrator is the written agreement reached in mediation and what
the administrator might hear anecdotally. On the other hand, placing
the mediator in the position of completing a report or recommending
sanctions on a party fundamentally changes the role of the mediator
from neutral facilitator to evaluator.205 The Uniform Mediation Act
prohibits mediators from making reports, assessments, evaluations,
recommendations, findings, or other communications "regarding a
mediation to a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may
make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject of the mediation."206
Confidential foreclosure ADR processes raise additional concerns
for self-represented homeowners. Mediation, because it is confidential,
may fail to bring to light loan servicers' misconduct or fraudulent
business practices, such as robo-signing, failure to provide proper
notice, and failure to comply with federal requirements for considering
NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 19.1.
202 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4635(c) (2012).
203 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31o(b) (2009) (stating that information submitted by the
mortgagor to the mediator, either orally or in writing, including financial documents, is not
subject to disclosure by the judicial branch).
204 For states that call ADR sessions "settlement conferences," "conciliation," or "dispute
resolution" sessions, instead of "mediation," as Hawaii, Indiana, and New York do, statutory
mediation confidentiality rules may not apply.
205 Heather Scheiwe Kulp at Resources Study Innovation for Court ADR has raised this
concern. See, e.g., Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Foreclosure Mediation, Saving Homes, and
Appropriate Dispute Resolution, JUST COURT ADR (Feb. 23, 2012), http://blog.aboutrsi.org/
2012/program-management/foreclosure-mediation-saving-homes-and-appropriate-dispute-
resolution.
206 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 7(a) (2003). There are few exceptions to this prohibition, one of
which is that mediators are permitted to disclose whether the mediation occurred or has
terminated, whether a settlement was reached, and who attended. Id. § 7(b). Of the
jurisdictions that have reporting requirements for mediators in their foreclosure mediation




homeowners' HAMP applications. Because of the mediator's neutral
role, the mediator may not be in a position to raise these problems and
hold the loan servicer accountable. And, unless the borrower is
exceptionally sophisticated, she or he will not know how to take action
either. Another concern for self-represented homeowners is if the
mediator fails to follow the prescribed mediation process, behaves
inappropriately, or lacks competence. In both circumstances, if the
borrower has legal counsel, then that lawyer can apply appropriate
pressure on the lender representative, inform the borrower of his or her
legal rights, and protect the borrower from agreeing to something that
may not be in his or her best interest.207
Using mediation and settlement conferences as the forum for
foreclosure negotiations rather than a judicial process in open court
does have the potential to hide loan servicer misconduct from public
view. Consumer advocates, if they had access to the contents of
mediation conversations, would not have to rely on anecdotal evidence
and would be in a better position to educate borrowers and advise policy
makers about what lenders and loan servicers are doing. Thus, there is a
tension between providing a safe environment that fosters candid
conversation and allows for individualized problem-solving, and
protecting consumers on a wide scale. One way in which programs can
strike a balance between these two competing interests is to make the
reporting responsibility of third-party facilitators known to all parties
and to provide facilitators with standard forms that capture the topics
discussed and objective outcomes.
E. Legal Counsel and Housing Counselors
One important way in which state and local governments can help
borrowers prepare for, and engage in, foreclosure negotiations is to
incorporate free, HUD-approved housing counseling organizations208
and legal assistance into their foreclosure ADR programs. To have the
greatest impact, borrowers should meet with counselors and attorneys
well in advance of a mediation or settlement conference. Programs can
pay for housing counseling and legal assistance with funds generated by
the program. Navigating the complex process of applying for a loan
207 The importance of legal counsel in informal processes like mediation has been noted by
scholars. Not only do lawyers provide knowledge of the substantive law and legal procedure,
but they can also leverage that knowledge strategically. Additionally, lawyers can empower their
clients, balance power inequalities, and provide emotional support. See Stephen Landsman,
Nothing for Something? Denying Legal Assistance to Those Compelled to Participate in ADR
Proceedings, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273 (2010); Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute
Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381 (2010).
208 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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modification, let alone overcoming the challenge of communicating
effectively with a loan servicer, is difficult for all homeowners. These
challenges are one reason the foreclosure crisis unfolded in the first
place. Housing counselors provide vital assistance to homeowners faced
with foreclosure by explaining the foreclosure timeline, working with
homeowners to create sustainable household budgets and reduce debt,
helping assemble loan modification applications or advising on non-
retention options, and negotiating with the lender's points of contact on
the homeowners' behalf. 209 Indeed, homeowners who work with a
housing counselor are more likely to obtain a loan modification with
larger payment reductions or find a sustainable cure for a delinquent
loan.210
Programs take one of three approaches for linking homeowners to
housing counselors. One is to have lenders simply inform homeowners
about the existence of housing counselors and to provide lists and
contact information for local, HUD-approved counseling agencies and
local, community-based resources. 21' The responsibility for initiating
contact with the housing counselor then rests on the homeowner. A
second approach is to make meeting with a housing counselor a
precondition for participating in a foreclosure ADR program. 212 The
209 The Urban Institute conducted a two-year study of the impact of the National
Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program, the federally funded program, overseen by
Neighborworks America, designed to increase the role of foreclosure intervention counseling in
the response to the foreclosure crisis. In its 2010 report, the Urban Institute found that
homeowners who worked with housing counselors were 1.7 times more likely to cure an
existing foreclosure than if they had not received counseling. On average, homeowners who
received counseling reduced their monthly payments by $267 more than those homeowners
who did not have counseling, and therefore, were more likely to remain current on the
modified loan. NEIL MAYER ET AL., THE URBAN INST., NATIONAL FORECLOSURE MITIGATION
COUNSELING PROGRAM EVALUATION: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM EFFECTS
vii-viii (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411982_NFMC-program_
evaluation.pdf.
210 A study by the Urban Institute evaluating the impact of the National Foreclosure
Mitigation Counseling Program, overseen by NeighborWorks America, found that individuals
who had received NFMC counseling had their loans modified by an average of $176 less than
individuals without counseling. Furthermore, homeowners who received counseling were sixty-
seven to seventy percent more likely to remain current on their mortgages after curing a serious
delinquency or foreclosure than those homeowners without counseling. NEIL MAYER ET AL.,
THE URBAN INST., NATIONAL FORECLOSURE MITIGATION COUNSELING PROGRAM EVALUATION:
FINAL REPORT ROUNDS 1 AND 2, at 106 (2011), available at http://www.urban.org/Uploaded
PDF/412475-National- Foreclosure-Mitigation-Counseling-Program-Evaluation.pdf.
211 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-311(c)(3) (2011) (requiring lenders to include in the
notice of foreclosure mediation materials from the Department of Banking that describe
community-based resources available to the mortgagor as well as approved housing counseling
agencies).
212 See, e.g., S.B. 1552 § 2a(1)-(2), 76th Leg. Assemb,, Reg. Sess. (Or. 2012), 2012 Or. Laws
Ch. 112, at 3 (requiring homeowners to consult with a housing counselor from a HUD-
approved organization before the scheduled date of the mediation and also requiring lenders to
include a statement in its foreclosure notice informing the borrower of the requirement to
consult with an approved housing counselor); N.M. Admin. Order No. 2009-00001, supra note
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homeowner may be required to present a certificate verifying meeting
with the housing counselor as a prerequisite to the mediation.213 The
third approach uses housing counselors as gatekeepers to the mediation
process itself. Homeowners are either automatically scheduled to meet
with a housing counselor214 or must take the initiative to make an
appointment,215 after which the housing counselor determines whether
to refer the homeowner for foreclosure mediation.
Free legal assistance for homeowners facing foreclosure is an
extremely valuable resource. Most homeowners in foreclosure are self-
represented216 primarily because they are not financially able to hire a
lawyer. Without legal assistance, homeowners are unlikely to be aware
of their legal protections under local, state, and federal laws, let alone
appropriate legal defenses to foreclosure. In addition, homeowners in
judicial foreclosure states must contend with court filings and the
intricacies of judicial procedure as self-represented litigants. Because of
these concerns surrounding alternative dispute processes and
foreclosure, some jurisdictions attach pro bono legal assistance to their
foreclosure mediation programs. 217 Other programs, like the one in
Cook County, provide homeowners with a free consultation with a pro
bono attorney.
Other states leveraged new professional responsibility rules to
encourage attorneys to provide pro bono services to homeowners in
93, 1 6(B), at 4 (requiring homeowner to consult with a counselor from a HUD-certified
housing counseling agency no less than twenty business days before the scheduled mediation).
213 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-80(c)(2)(F) (West 2012) (requiring the homeowner to
produce verification of counseling by an approved housing counselor or an approved budget
and credit counselor); H.B. 1374, 430th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (requiring
homeowners seeking to obtain certification of participation in housing counseling as a
precondition to mediation).
214 Some courts in New York's larger jurisdictions schedule homeowners for a pre-
settlement conference screening meeting at the courthouse where they meet with HUD-
approved housing counselors and volunteer lawyers, if needed. See PFAU, supra note 148, at 7-
8.
215 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 61.24.160(3), 61.24.163(1) (2012) (reserving the state
foreclosure mediation program only for borrowers who have been referred to mediation by a
housing counselor or attorney, and also requiring housing counselors to refer homeowners to
mediation based on their individual circumstances).
216 Justin Wagner, Assisting Distressed Homeowners to Avoid Foreclosure: An Advocate's Role
in an Evolving Judicial and Policy Environment, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 423, 443-45
(2010) (citing a study by the Brennan Center for Justice that, of homeowners facing foreclosure
proceedings for high-cost, non-traditional mortgages, between eighty-four and ninety-two
percent proceeded without full legal representation).
217 New York and Philadelphia make attorneys available, free of charge, to eligible
homeowners. David Streitfeld, New York Courts Vow Legal Aid in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2011, at B1 ("[B]y the end of the year, any homeowner in foreclosure who does not have a
lawyer will be supplied one by legal aid groups or other pro bono groups."); see also Get Legal
Help, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA, http://www.clsphila.org/Content.aspx?id=1 15 (last visited
May 20, 2013).
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foreclosure ADR by permitting forms of limited representation. 218 States
launched state-wide programs to train attorneys who could volunteer to
help distressed homeowners in foreclosure mediation. 219 Training
covers the basics of foreclosure procedure, available state and federal
assistance programs, and expectations for foreclosure ADR.
Homeowners going into a foreclosure ADR session and seeking legal
assistance are matched with trained pro bono attorneys who can review
borrowers' documents, research available options, and negotiate during
the mediation session. In Maryland, attorneys who completed
foreclosure prevention training also provided brief advice during
foreclosure solutions workshops held around the state.
F. Exchanging of Documents
Two primary objectives of foreclosure ADR programs are to create
open, transparent communication between the parties and provide
oversight of loan servicer behavior. An essential tool for reaching these
objectives is to require parties to exchange key documents prior to, or
during, the mediation or settlement conference. The specific documents
required may be included in the statutory language itself 220 or
determined by the entity in charge of administering the mediation
program. 221 Homeowners and loan servicers can either mail the
information directly to each other, submit documents to a third party222
or they can upload the documents onto a secure, online platform.23
218 See, e.g., MD. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 6.5; OHIO R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.2(c).
219 In fact, it was by participating in Maryland's attorney training program that I first
became involved in foreclosure mediation work. I taught my students about foreclosure
mediation and folded counseling at foreclosure workshops into the work of the Mediation
Clinic for Families at the University of Baltimore School of Law.
220 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 667-80(c) (2012).
221 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1(h)(1) (West 2012) (requiring Maryland's
Commissioner of Financial Regulation to determine which documents lenders must provide to
the borrower prior to mediation).
222 The third party can be either a housing counselor or court administrator, Timothy C.
Evans & Moshe Jacobius, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CNTY., IL., MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION PROGRAM: PROGRESS REPORT 9 (2012), available at http://www.cookcounty
court.org/Portals/O/Chancery%2ODivision/Forclosure%2OMediation/Foreclosure%2OMediation
%20Progress%2OReport%20June%202012%20(with%2OAppendixes).pdf, the government
entity in charge of administering the mediation or settlement program, HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-
80(c) (2012), or sometimes the mediator, WASH. REV. CODE§ 61.24.163(4) (2012)).
223 For example, Indiana created a secure, online portal that borrowers and lender
representatives can access to upload required documents. Borrowers and lenders, as well as
their attorneys and housing counselors, can create accounts through the portal and invite other
parties to access the specific loan information by sharing a unique invitation code. DMM
Portal, DEFAULT MITIGATION MANAGEMENT, https://www.dclmwp.com (last visited May 20,
2013). Other jurisdictions, like Maryland and Hawaii, created online portals to allow borrowers
to submit home retention applications to their lenders. The online portals avoid the delay and
risk of lost paperwork that come with mailing and faxing.
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Failure to comply with the mandated document exchange should be
considered a violation of applicable good faith requirements24 and
subject the violator to sanctions.
Homeowners' required documents should relate to their financial
status and eligibility for loan modification programs. To show their
financial status, borrowers can produce proof of current and anticipated
income, debts, and assets; 225 tax returns for the past two years; hardship
information; and a detailed budget of monthly expenses. They should
provide information about the mortgage and payment history,
including records or correspondence relating to the default or loan
modification; verification of counseling from an approved housing
counselor including the counselor's contact information; and a
complete modification package for all applicable federal loan
modification programs.
Homeowners should submit these documents in advance of the
mediation or settlement conference to maximize efficiency. Usually, the
person physically present at the mediation representing the lender is a
lawyer hired by the loan servicer and the person with decision-making
authority participates in the mediation by phone. The attorney in the
room may not know how to extract the right information from the
financial documents, run a net present value analysis, or evaluate a
borrower's loan modification package and the loan servicer on the
phone cannot see the documents that the borrower brings to the
mediation. By having the borrower submit her documents before the
mediation, the loan servicer can make the necessary assessment of
whether it is best to pursue the foreclosure or whether an alternative,
such as a modification under HAMP or a non-retention option, is more
appropriate. With this assessment complete, the scope of the settlement
negotiation can be clarified for all parties.
Many programs require documents from servicers and lenders that
are necessary to determine whether there is legal standing to pursue
foreclosure and, if so, whether a proper assessment has been completed
to determine if foreclosure really is the proper remedy. To prove proper
legal standing, loan servicers may have to produce a copy of the
promissory note signed by the mortgagor that also includes
endorsements, amendments, or riders; a copy of the mortgage
document evidencing the lender's legal interest in the property and the
right to foreclose; and payment history and correspondence confirming
the loan's default status. Loan servicers may also need to provide a
224 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(10)(a) (2012). But, not all programs include a
good faith requirement.
225 Proof may be in the form of copies of pay stubs, W-2 forms, social security or disability
income, retirement income, child support income, or any other income relevant to the
homeowner's ability repay the mortgage. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-80(c)(2)(a) (2012).
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sufficiently detailed explanation of why previous requests for loan
modification, forbearance, or other foreclosure alternatives were denied;
an itemized list of the best estimate of arrearages, fees, and outstanding
charges; a recent appraisal of the property; and borrower-related and
mortgage-related input used in any net present value analysis. Some
programs also require loan servicers to produce any provisions in the
pooling and servicing agreement that prohibit the loan servicer from
modifying the loan or forgiving a deficiency upon short sale, along with
proof that the servicer has attempted to obtain a waiver of those
provisions.226 This last piece of information is extremely important for
understanding what obligations the loan servicer has to the investor
trust and whether these obligations can be waived in certain
situations.227
A document exchange requirement proves efficient and opens lines
of communication early. Parties have the essential information up front,
are spared the need to request and then wait for information, and can
come to the mediation sessions prepared.228 Compelling parties to
provide specific pieces of information, such as the pooling and servicing
agreement governing the loan or the homeowner's financial statements,
makes the parties' respective positions transparent. The loan servicer
can begin assessing the borrower for a loan modification or other
retention plan before the mediation begins. The borrower can know,
before walking into a negotiation, whether keeping the house is an
option on the negotiation table or whether to focus on non-retention
foreclosure alternatives, like a short sale or a deed in lieu of
foreclosure. 229 Furthermore, requiring loan servicers to show their
226 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-80(c)(1) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4633(a)(2)-(3)
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(5) (2012).
227 In one foreclosure mediation I observed, the loan servicer was unable to provide the
homeowner with a loan modification because the pooling and servicing agreement between the
loan servicer and the investor trust prohibited the mortgage interest from dropping below
10.5%. HAMP does not, and cannot, force loan servicers to break the terms of their servicing
contract in order to modify a loan; however, it would have been interesting to see whether the
loan servicer might have appealed successfully to the investor trust in seeking a waiver of this
provision, proof of which is required by Hawaii and Washington's programs.
228 Pre-mediation exchange of information has proved a challenge for Maine's foreclosure
mediation program. Parties arrive at the first mediation unprepared to negotiate because: 1) the
homeowner has not provided the lender with necessary documents; 2) the financial
information provided by the homeowner was incomplete or not current; 3) the lender did not
receive information the homeowner reportedly sent; 4) the lender requests additional
information from the homeowner, and 5) the lender has not reviewed the homeowner's
information, despite timely receipt. When this happens, frequently the mediators set a date for
an additional mediation session so that the parties can exchange the identified, necessary
information and return to the second mediation session prepared to work on an agreement.
DIANE E. KENTY, FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM: REPORT TO THE JOINT STANDING
COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 4-5 (2012), available at
http://www.courts.state.me.us/reports-pubs/reports/pdf/fdp-ar 2011 .pdf.
229 Nevada also requires both the lender and the borrower to submit to the mediator, prior
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analysis for a loan modification forces them out of automation, the way
of doing business that contributed to the foreclosure crisis in the first
place. To show their analysis, they must in fact compare the costs and
benefits of foreclosure and determine which outcome, foreclosure or
some alternative, will maximize recovery for the investors with
mortgage backed securities. Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail
in the next section, programs can ensure party compliance with
document exchange by issuing sanctions. For the loan servicer or
lender, the foreclosure may be dismissed in a judicial foreclosure
jurisdiction or they may not be granted the mediation certification
necessary for moving forward with foreclosure. For the borrower, the
opportunity to participate in the ADR program may be lost.
G. Judicial Oversight and Sanctions
State and local governments are more likely to reach their
objectives if foreclosure ADR program rules are enforced. Almost all
existing foreclosure ADR programs built sanctionable offenses and
corresponding penalties into the program rules. As discussed above,230
many programs rely upon mediators to report when a party fails to
comply with rules. Thus, jurisdictions that enumerate each sanctionable
offense are more likely to have accurate reporting than those
jurisdictions that have a blanket good faith requirement.231 Upon
receiving reports of misconduct, courts in both judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure jurisdictions should consistently enforce program rules by
ordering sanctions against offending parties.
Common sanctionable offenses for both borrowers and lenders
exist to compel parties to come to the negotiation table prepared to
work out viable alternatives to foreclosure. For example, borrowers and
lenders that fail to appear at the mediation session, fail to cooperate and
participate in it, or fail to exchange required documents before deadline
are subject to sanctions.232 Additionally, failure to have someone with
to the mediation session, a confidential, non-binding settlement proposal. NEV. FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION R. 11.9.
230 See supra Part III.D.
231 See supra note 196-197 and accompanying text. Delaware, Vermont, and Maine require
mediators to report lack of good faith but do not provide objective criteria for what that might
look like. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5062C(e)(2), (f) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-
A(12) (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4634(b)(A)(2) (2012). For more on good faith
requirement in foreclosure mediation, see MELANCA CLARK & DANIEL OLMOS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION: EMERGING RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PRACTICES
(2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atj/foreclosure-mediation.pdf; GEOFF WALSH, NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FORECLOSURE MEDIATION (2011).
232 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 42-815.02(e) (2012). Failures to pay mediation fees can also
generate sanctions, but those sanctions target the sustainability of the program rather than
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authority to make decisions about the loan present at the mediation
session, or connected via teleconference, exposes a party to sanctions.233
Both parties can be sanctioned for failing to take the negotiation
seriously, but some sanctions only target loan servicer behavior; for
example, proceeding with foreclosure even though it is not in investors'
best interest.234
Borrowers and lenders that commit sanctionable offenses face a
range of penalties. Borrowers may be fined or may lose their
opportunity to mediate. Any stay on the foreclosure proceeding can be
lifted to enable a foreclosure sale to proceed.235 Lenders who violate
program rules face case dismissals in judicial foreclosure states and, in
nonjudicial states, either a stay of foreclosure proceedings or prohibition
on recording foreclosure sale notices.236 Dismissals and stays do not
prevent the lender from initiating foreclosure in the future.
Additionally, delaying foreclosure while a borrower is in default
ultimately harms the borrower. The longer the loan delinquency
remains uncured, the more mortgage penalties and late fees accrue and
the harder it becomes for a borrower to workout foreclosure
alternatives.237 Thus, financial penalties against lenders are effective and
do not carry unintended, negative consequence for borrowers. In
addition, financial penalties can include fines paid to the mediation
program administrator or directly to the borrower. 238
impressing upon parties the importance of the opportunity to negotiate.
233 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(I1) (2010) (requiring the mortgagee who has
the authority to agree to a proposed settlement, loan modification, or dismissal of the action, to
appear in person or participate by telephone with a representative present, and also requiring
the presence of the borrower, counsel for the lender, and counsel for the borrower, if
represented); WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(10)(c) (2011) (considering it a violation of the duty
of good faith to fail to designate representatives with adequate authority to settle, compromise,
or otherwise reach resolution in mediation).
234 For example, Washington gives borrowers a right to enjoin, or set aside, a foreclosure
proceeding if the net present value of a proposed modified loan exceeds the anticipated net
recovery at a foreclosure sale. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(14)(c) (2012). A loan servicer in
Washington also violates its duty to mediate in good faith by asking a borrower to waive any
potential future claims connected with the mortgage as a precondition to the lender agreeing to
a modification. See WASH. STATE DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION
SCHEDULING NOTICE, http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/FFP-Foreclosure-Mediation-
Scheduling-Form.doc.
235 HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-82(b) (2012) (authorizing sanctions against an owner-occupant
for unjustified noncompliance with the program that include removing the stay of the
foreclosure and maximum $1500 payment to the mortgagee).
236 See, e.g., PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-217. Washington makes a
lender's failure to comply with the foreclosure mediation statute a defense to foreclosure.
WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(14)(a) (2012).
237 MORTG. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 26, at 4; Letter from Geoff Walsh, Staff Attorney,
Consumer Law Center, to Supreme Court of Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Committee (May
23, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Walsh Letter].
238 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 42-815.02(e)(2)(A) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-82(b)(1) (2012);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 5062C(k) (2012) (preventing lenders from claiming attorneys' fees if
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Courts in judicial and nonjudicial jurisdictions oversee foreclosure
mediation and settlement programs, ordering sanctions against parties
for violating rules. Judicial oversight may be triggered by a mediator's
report or a parties' petition for sanctions.239 In Nevada, even though
courts have the power to impose sanctions on parties,240 sanctions were
at the discretion of local courts until the Nevada Supreme Court
interpreted judicial oversight of foreclosure mediation programs as a
statutory mandate.241 The Nevada Supreme Court now issues a report
detailing lender compliance with the program's statutory
requirements. 242 Courts in Connecticut and Maine, both judicial
foreclosure states, also have judicial guidelines to sanction lenders and
loan services for failure to comply with program rules.243 Maine's courts,
for example, have required lenders to reimburse homeowners'
attorney's fees and prohibited lenders from charging the homeowner for
accrued interest and fees while the foreclosure action remains in
mediation.244
Florida's statewide managed mediation program demonstrates
what happens when there is inadequate or inconsistent judicial
oversight. The statewide program contained provisions for a local court
to impose sanctions against parties present without the authority to
the lender does not appear at mediation prepared or fails to comply with any other program
rule); S.B. 1552 § 4a(5), 76th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2012), 2012 Or. Laws Ch. 112, at 4
(2012) (requiring lenders to pay the borrower for actual damages incurred from the lender's
failure to comply with the statutorily mandated provisions).
239 For example, Maryland gives borrowers three years from the date of the order ratifying
sale to bring an action against a lender for failing to comply with the statutorily mandated
foreclosure rules. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1(q) (West 2012). In Nevada, if either
party does not fulfill the obligations of a temporary agreement, the aggrieved party may file a
petition for judicial review. NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 16.3.
240 NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 21.
241 Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1285-87 (Nev. 2011) (holding that the
district courts must sanction parties that violate requirements of the foreclosure mediation
statute and that courts may not certify completion and permit continuation of foreclosure, but
that in determining the sanctions to be imposed, district courts should consider, among other
things, "whether the violations were intentional, the amount of prejudice to the nonviolating
party, and the violating party's willingness to mitigate any harm by continuing meaningful
negotiation"); see also Leyva v. Nat'l Default Serving Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Nev. 2011)
(finding that failure to bring required documents to mediation is a sanctionable offense and
that district courts should determine and order appropriate sanctions).
242 See, e.g., FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM, SUPREME COURT OF NEV., FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION PROGRAM BENEFICIARY COMPLIANCE OUTCOMES (2012), http://www.nevada
judiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandforms/func-startdown/8318 (detailing the extent to
which the six primary loan servicers in Nevada (Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan
Chase, Ally/GMAC, US Bank, CitiGroup) and others complied with statutory requirements of
the state foreclosure mediation program, such as attendance at mediation, production of
required documents, authority to negotiate, and good faith participation).
243 See, e.g., STATE OF CONN. SUPERIOR COURT, UNIFORM FORECLOSURE MEDIATION
STANDING ORDERS (2010), http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/Standorders/Civil/FMP_010
510.pdf.
244 KENTY, supra note 228, at 7.
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settle cases, exchange documents, or otherwise comply with program
rules;245 however, lack of consistency in judicial oversight across all
circuit courts resulted in the Florida supreme court's decision to
terminate the program altogether.246
Sanctioning violating parties demonstrates the importance of the
program. Judicial oversight only has to occur a few times to make an
example of unacceptable loan servicer or borrower behavior and send a
clear message that compliance will be taken seriously.247 Likewise, a lack
of judicial enforcement of program rules through authorized sanctions
communicates to parties that mediation and settlement conferences
need not be taken seriously, ultimately undermining the point of these
programs in the first place.
H. Program Costs and Funding
Cost and funding of ADR foreclosure programs are extremely
important in determining whether foreclosure ADR programs can
become permanent fixtures in the foreclosure landscape. Programs that
are self-sustaining or that even generate additional revenue for the state
are far more likely to endure than those paid for by grants or state
budgets already stretched-thin. Another important consideration is
who, between the loan servicer and the borrower, ultimately bears the
cost of participating in a foreclosure ADR process. Programs that
require both loan servicers and borrowers to pay a fee ensure that both
parties are invested in the negotiation process; however, it is important
to place restrictions on the ability of loan servicers to shift the costs of
an alternative process to an already financially distressed borrower.
The cost of a program depends on variety of factors, such as the
volume of cases, the number of mediation sessions held in each case,
whether support services like housing counseling and legal assistance
are included,248 and how much mediators are paid.249 Additionally, pre-
245 Fla. Guidance Concerning Managed Mediation Programs, supra note 110, at 3, 7, A8-
A12.
246 The Assessment Workgroup for the Managed Mediation Program for Residential
Mortgage Foreclosure Cases reported that public comments demonstrated that servicers widely
resisted providing their representatives at mediation full authority and refused to consider
more than a narrow range of foreclosure alternatives of little value to borrower. Further,
servicers had financial incentives not to settle and to keep foreclosure cases in limbo to avoid
the expenses of home ownership. A sample of Eleventh Circuit foreclosure illustrated that
78.5% of the cases remained open up to two years after failing to settle in mediation. Palmer
Letter, supra note 108, at 4. The Assessment Workgroup further recommended that the Court
establish a separate workgroup to explore sanctions for noncompliance. Id. at 2.
247 Walsh Letter, supra note 237.
248 For example, Maryland pays for housing counselors out of a specially designated
Housing Counseling and Foreclosure Mediation Fund. MD. CODE ANN., Hous. & CMTY. DEV.
§ 4-507(c)(4) (West 2010).
20131 1947
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1889
mediation screening overseen by program administrators impacts the
overall cost of a program.
Jurisdictions across the country use inventive approaches to pay for
their foreclosure mediation programs. Some rely on existing salaried
personnel and volunteers.250 Others use direct2sl or indirect government
funding.252 An increasing number of foreclosure mediation programs
are self-supporting. In these programs, either the lender253 or the
borrower,254 or sometimes both, bears the cost of the mediation through
filing surcharges, mediation participation fees, and penalties for failure
to comply with program requirements. 255 The collected fees and
penalties go into a separate operating fund to pay for mediators,
249 Having resources to pay for skilled, trained mediators is crucial. The foreclosure
mediation program in Washington, D.C., has been underfunded and unable to obtain qualified
mediators. The $300 per case flat fee per mediation is not enough to attract good mediators,
especially if the time spent in mediation is seven to eight hours. DEP'T OF INS., SEC. & BANKING,
COUNCIL OF D.C., PERFORMANCE OVERSIGHT QUESTIONS 18 (2012), http://www.dccouncil.us/
files/user.uploads/budget.responses/fyl 11 2agencyperformance-disb-responses.pdf.
250 Both Philadelphia and Cook County, Illinois, use both volunteers and existing court
personnel. See THE REINVESTMENT FUND, supra note 162; see also EVANS & JACOBIUS, supra
note 131, at 5-6.
251 New York's Division of Housing and Community Renewal provides funding for housing
counselors, attorneys, and court programs; its budget was increased by $25 million for 2010. In
Cook County, Illinois, the Board of Commissioners designated $3.5 million for its program.
Iowa's Attorney General gave Iowa Mediation Services $4500 won in a fraud settlement against
Ameriquest. Iowa's program received an additional $1.5 million in federal stimulus money but
is currently seeking alternative funds to continue the program. Kentucky had a grant from the
Annie E. Casey Foundation for its mediation program in Jefferson County as well as state and
federal grants. HEATHER SCHEIWE KULP, RESOLUTION SYS. INST., FORECLOSURE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROGRAM MODELS STATE-BY-STATE 48, 59, 67, 101 (2012), available at
http://aboutrsi.org/pfimages/ForeclosureMediationProgramModels-September2Ol2.pdf.
252 For example, Connecticut's program is funded by the State Banking Fund, which is
funded by bank and credit union assessments; securities registration; and registration,
application, license, and examination fees for investment brokers and dealers. Thus, entities
participating in the banking industry pay for the foreclosure mediation program rather than
Connecticut's individual tax payers. 2008 Conn. Acts, Public Act No. 08-176 (Reg. Sess.);
KEVIN P. JOHNSTON & ROBERT G. JAEKLE, CONN. AUDITORS OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, AUDITOR'S
REPORT: DEPARTMENT OF BANKING FOR THE FISCAL YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 2003 AND 2004 2-3
(2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/apa/reports/Banking,%20Department%20of 2005
0608_FY2003,2004.pdf.
253 For example, in Delaware, foreclosure mediation is free for borrowers, but lenders must
pay a $500 fee. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5062C(e)(3), (i)(8), (q) (2012); Del. Admin. Directive
No. 2012-2, supra note 170, § 13.1, at 17.
254 In the District of Columbia, borrowers pay a fee for mediation but not lenders.
Borrowers who elect to participate in mediation must pay $50. D.C. CODE § 42-815.02(d)(1)
(2012).
255 Lenders in the District of Columbia pay $300 fee for filing a Notice of Default, and, if a
borrower requests mediation, they are potentially subject to a $500 civil penalty for failing to
attend the mediation, to provide the documents required for the mediation, or to participate in
good faith. Lenders are further subject to a $1000 civil penalty for breaching the terms of a
settlement agreement reached through mediation. D.C. CODE § 42-815.02(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii),
(e)(4)(A)(i)-(ii), (f).
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administrative costs, and operating expenses. 256 Surplus in the operating
fund can be distributed to housing counselors and non-profit agencies
that assist with the program.2 57
Some programs actually generate additional revenue for the state.
In Nevada and Washington, both of which are nonjudicial foreclosure
states that created foreclosure mediation programs through legislative
statute, mediators are paid directly by the borrower and lender.258
However, when lenders file notices of default they must pay state fees,
which are collected and redistributed. In Nevada, recording a notice of
default and an election to sell costs the lender $200, of which $45 goes
into the Account for Foreclosure Mediation, $5 goes into an account to
provide legal services for the indigent, and the remaining $150 is
deposited into the State General Fund. According to the National
Consumer Law Center, in only one year after it was implemented, the
$200 notice surcharge generated between six and eight million dollars,
which was used to reduce the Nevada's deficit.259 Washington takes a
slightly different approach and channels its surplus funds to homeowner
assistance programs rather than into the general revenue fund.260
Generating revenue from lenders and diverting that revenue into state
coffers is a creative way to fund consumer protection and legal services
programs.
However, while many of these costs appear to be paid by the
lender, it is important to note that, in most jurisdictions, lenders are
256 See, e.g., Del. Admin. Directive No. 2012-2, supra note 170, § 13.7, at 17.
257 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5062C(q) (2012). Compare this with the Washington, D.C.,
program, which prohibits reverting monies from the Foreclosure Mediation Fund for general
use by the District. D.C. CODE § 42-815.03 (2011).
258 Each party pays the mediator $200 per session. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.163(17) (2012);
NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 5(1); WASH. STATE DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 186;
Washington Foreclosure Mediation Program, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF FIN. INST., http://www.dfi.
wa.gov/consumers/homeownership/foreclosure-mediation.htm#.UZvZNcopnNM (last visited
Apr. 4, 2013).
259 See WALSH, supra note 38, at 35.
260 Washington's Foreclosure Fairness Act created a "foreclosure fairness account" into
which lenders must pay $250 for each property issued a notice of default. Engrossed Substitute
H.B. 2614 §§ 8(2), 12, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 61.24.172, .174(2) (2012)). Lenders that are FDIC insured and have issued fewer than 250
default notices in the preceding year are exempt from this fee. Id. § 8(5) (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 61.24.174(5)). Expenditures from the account are made as follows: up to thirteen
percent goes to the state Commerce Department for implementation of the Foreclosure
Fairness Act, which includes the foreclosure mediation program; no less than seventy-six
percent must be used for housing counseling for borrowers; up to six percent is to be used by
the consumer protection division; up to two percent goes to the office of civil legal aid to
provide homeowners with legal representation; and up to three percent goes to the Department
of Financial Institutions for homeowner pre-purchase and post-purchase outreach and
education programs. Id. § 12 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.172). Monies given to civil
legal aid out of the foreclosure fairness account must be used to supplement, not supplant,
federal, state, and local dollars received by the state's civil legal aid. Id. § 12(3) (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.172(3)).
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permitted to shift foreclosure-related costs to the borrower by including
those costs in the total amount the borrower owes. The lender can
recoup those foreclosure-related costs from the proceeds of the sale of
the house or include them in a deficiency judgment that attaches to the
borrower. These foreclosure-related costs include the cost of
participating in mediation. Therefore, even though a program may
require a lender to pay for the mediation, if the mediation does not
result in an agreement that would permit the borrower to stay in the
home, then the borrower ultimately pays the costs when they are
subtracted from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale or added to the
deficiency. Vermont is one of the few states to take affirmative steps to
prevent this fee-shifting from lender to borrower in situations where the
foreclosure sale results in a deficiency.261
CONCLUSION
As existing foreclosure ADR programs continue to operate and as
new ones emerge, a crucial next step for foreclosure ADR programs is a
systematic evaluation of every program according to the same metrics.
Although a few programs have collected data, meaningful comparison
across programs remains difficult. 262 First, these programs are
fundamentally different, with varying objectives, structures,
261 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4637(c) (2012) ("If the foreclosure action results in a sale with a
surplus, the mortgagee may recover the full cost of mediation to the extent of the surplus.
Otherwise, the mortgagee may not shift to the mortgagor the costs of the mortgagee's or the
servicing agent's attorney's fees or travel costs related to mediation but may shift up to one-half
of the costs of the mediator."); see also D.C. CODE § 42-815.02(0 (2012) (prohibiting lenders
from recovering the $300 notice of default filing fee if there is a deficiency upon the sale of the
foreclosed property).
262 Compare, for example, programs in Philadelphia and Nevada. Since Philadelphia's
diversion program began in 2008, seventy percent of all eligible households participated in
foreclosure conciliation conferences. REG'L HOUS. LEGAL SERVS., No PLACE LIKE HOME:
PHILADELPHIA'S APPROACH TO FORECLOSURE PREVENTION 8 (2011), available at
http://rhls.org/wp-content/uploads/NoPlaceLikeHome RHLS.pdf. Of those who participated
between 2008 and 2011, twenty percent ended in agreement, two percent ended in bankruptcy,
three percent ended in no agreement and twenty-two percent were still pending. HEATHER
SCHEIWE KULP, RESOLUTION SYSTEMS INSTITUTE, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION AND MITIGATION
PROGRAM MODELS 34-35 (2011), available at http://courtadr.org/files/ForeclosureMediation
ProgramModelsMay201 l.pdf.
Meanwhile, Nevada's foreclosure mediation program, from September 2009 through
December 2011, held 15,274 mediations. Forty percent of those cases resulted in an agreement
to a foreclosure alternative: twenty-six percent resulted in an agreement that allowed the
homeowner to remain in the home, and fourteen percent resulted in a non-retention agreement
that allowed the homeowner to vacate the home without a foreclosure proceeding. See VERISE
V. CAMPBELL, STATE OF NEVADA FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM 5 (2012), available
at http://www.phladelphiafed.org/community-development/events/2012/reinventing-older-
communities/resources/campbell-051012-0830.pdf (presenting historical foreclosure outcome
statistics).
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jurisdictional capabilities and local needs. Second, for those programs
that are sufficiently similar to lend themselves to theoretical
comparison, data collected often are compiled using different metrics.26
3
To assist programs with assessment, the Access to Justice Commission
at the U.S. Department of Justice convened a working group to develop
suggestions for how programs should gather data for evaluation
purposes. 264 The working group's suggestions include tracking
important program characteristics. However, to compare outcomes,
variations in local housing markets and local economies (e.g.,
unemployment or underwater properties) need to be controlled for
because they impact whether a foreclosure is avoidable.
Until a thorough evaluation of these programs has been completed
and it is possible to connect a program's outcomes to its structure and
local economy, it seems premature to unequivocally declare one
program's model as superior. In addition, because the local economy is
such an important variable to consider when constructing a foreclosure
ADR program, jurisdictions should be given requisite flexibility to
design programs that best respond to local needs. It might also be that,
for jurisdictions that had the greatest housing booms and now see
263 Compare foreclosure mediation and settlement programs in Cook County, Illinois, and
New Jersey. While Cook Co. tracked settlement rates and outcomes, New Jersey only tracked
settlement rates, making it impossible to know to what the parties agreed. EVANS & JACOBIUS,
supra note 131, at 23 (providing statistics from the program's first year that show that, of the
627 mediations conducted, thirty-four percent of homeowners remained in their homes with
permanent loan modifications, thirty percent negotiated alternative agreements with the lender,
and thirty-six percent came to no agreement and foreclosure proceeded along the traditional
litigation track); cf. N.J. DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO THE
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED BUDGET FOR FY 2011-2012, at 17
(reporting that between January 2009 and January 2011 5300 cases completed mediation with
twenty-six percent resulting in permanent settlement, twenty-three percent receiving
provisional settlement, and fifty percent ending in no settlement).
Connecticut and Maine have also collected detailed records on the terms of the mediated
agreements. KENTY, supra note 228, at 4-5 (explaining that foreclosure was avoided in at least
twenty-eight percent of cases participating in the program, and that, for the cases in which an
agreement was reached in mediation and the lender subsequently dismissed the foreclosure
proceeding, fifty-nine percent of cases resulted in an agreement to modify the loan, in four
percent of cases the lender agreed to reinstate the loan, and in one percent of cases the parties
agreed to a repayment/forbearance plan; parties also agreed to a range of non-retention
agreements: five percent agreed to a short sale, 1.7% to a deed in lieu of foreclosure); STATE OF
CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM RESULTS (2012),
http://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/FMP/FMP-pie.pdf (showing that between July 1, 2008, and
December 31, 2011, 12,805 cases completed mediation through its Foreclosure Mediation
Program and, of those cases, sixty-seven percent resulted in the borrower staying in the home
(fifty-five percent loan modification, five percent reinstatement of the loan, seven percent
forbearance/repayment plan), eighteen percent were not settled, and fifteen percent resulted in
the borrower moving from the home (this percentage includes agreements for a sale, a short
sale, a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or an extension of the law day or sale date)).
264 The working group's first report, issued in December 2011, presents best practices for
research and evaluation of foreclosure mediation programs. See CLARK & OLMOS, supra note
231, at 9-19.
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homeowners saddled with underwater mortgages, policy measures other
than, or in addition to, mediation will be required for economic
stabilization.265
Nevertheless, foreclosure ADR programs developed by state and
local governments are a creative solution to problems that lie at the
heart of the foreclosure crisis. By introducing facilitated negotiation as a
compulsory step in foreclosure proceedings, these programs reconstruct
important aspects of the borrower-lender relationship lost by
securitization. Specifically, they establish clear lines of communication
and require the third-party loan servicer to behave as a traditional
lender might, assessing whether foreclosure in fact makes the most
financial sense for investors or whether an alternative might yield a
greater return on the investment.
Since securitization has become a fixture in the residential
mortgage landscape, states should incorporate foreclosure ADR
programs as a permanent part of their residential foreclosure
procedures. 266 State legislatures in both judicial and nonjudicial
jurisdictions have the power to create foreclosure ADR programs that
pay for themselves and that even generate revenue for government
coffers. Programs can maximize the probability that a delinquent loan
will be cured if they introduce the opportunity to negotiate early in the
process and also create a finite negotiation timeframe during which the
foreclosure cannot move forward. Programs that enroll homeowners
automatically, rather than relying on homeowner initiative to self-
enroll, are more likely to reach those homeowners in greatest need of
assistance. Negotiations facilitated by a trained, neutral third party
ensure that the problem-solving process is structured, balanced, and
well-informed. Folding in housing counseling and legal assistance to
educate homeowners further empowers and protects homeowners
during negotiations. Programs that demand an exchange of documents,
similar to a pre-settlement discovery that parties do not have to
affirmatively request, builds efficiency and transparency into the
negotiation process and also guarantees that the loan servicer has proper
legal standing to foreclose. Finally, enumerating sanctionable offenses
265 See, e.g., Robert C. Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain
Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt That Can Benefit Literally Everyone (Cornell Legal
Studies, Research Paper, No. 12-64, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2173358;
Morning Edition: County Considers Eminent Doman as a Foreclosure Fix, National Public Radio
(July 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/13/156683302/county-considers-eminent-domain-
as-foreclosure-fix.
266 The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2002, should be revised to include mandatory
communications between loan servicers and borrowers prior to foreclosure sale. UNIF.
NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT (2002), available at http://www.uniformlaws.orglshared/docs/
nonjudicial%20foreclosure/nonjudicial foreclosure-final-02.pdf.
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and corresponding penalties gives parties recourse to request judicial
oversight and helps enforce program rules.
Foreclosure ADR programs are unprecedented for a variety of
reasons. While this article takes a first step in providing a
comprehensive analysis of existing programs' key components, further
study of their legal implications is warranted. For instance, these
programs raise questions about the specificity with which some ADR
programs regulate loan servicers' behavior. Although there is nothing
new about ordering parties in a legal dispute to settlement conferences
or mediation, it is unusual to prescribe the content of negotiations and
then require one of the parties to justify its decision-making. This
micromanaging of loan servicer conduct by many ADR programs
reveals a deep mistrust and lack of deference to loan servicers on the
part of state and local governments. In a sense, when it comes to making
decisions about foreclosure, governments are overriding loan servicers'
private business judgment and replacing it with one that in their
estimation better serves the public's interest.
An additional question these programs raise is how to ensure ADR
processes are appropriately used as a vehicle for regulating an industry
and protecting consumers. ADR processes like mediation and
conciliation are designed for parties that have autonomy and equal
bargaining power. But homeowners in foreclosure ADR come to the
negotiation table on unequal footing because, assuming there are no
legal defenses to foreclosure, homeowners have no real power over
whether their loan can be modified. Even the loan servicer's power to
modify loans is restricted by the servicing agreements, which are
imposed on homeowners' loans long after the loan is granted and
without homeowner knowledge or consent. An additional defining
feature of ADR processes is that they come covered with a blanket of
confidentiality that can be removed only in exceptional circumstances.
If the goal of lawmakers is to police loan servicers and protect
consumers from loan servicer misconduct, then they need to be aware
not only of ADR processes' potential benefits but also of their
limitations. As policymakers continue to rely on the ADR process to
address the foreclosure crisis, they must consider how to answer these
questions.
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